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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW -

COVERAGE -

PRESENCE OF INCIPIENT

FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATION ALLOWS FEDERAL COURT RATHER
THAN THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY TO DECIDE COVERAGE OF THE
INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT.

SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
On July 27, 1967, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
issued a formal order pursuant to the Investment Advisers Act' directing an investigation of the Wall Street Transcript Corporation (Transcript) to determine whether Transcript was an unregistered investment
8
adviser in violation of section 202 of the Act.2 Pursuant to this order,
4
the president of Transcript was served with a subpoena duces tecum
to appear before the SEC. The president appeared on the scheduled date
but refused to produce documents or render information, claiming, inter
alia, that as a bona fide newspaper Transcript was exempt from coverage
under section 202(a) (11) (D) of the Act 5 and that to enforce the subpoena would operate as a prior restraint on Transcript's freedom of the
1. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b (1964).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (1964), states in pertinent part:

[I]t shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, unless registered under this
section, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce in connection with his or its business as an investment adviser.
An investment adviser is defined as:
[a]ny person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others,
either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities
or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who,
for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses
or reports concerning securities.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1964). Later provisions of the section exclude banks,
lawyers, accountants, engineers, teachers whose stock reporting is incidental to their
primary functions, and brokers who receive no extra compensation for their work.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(a) (1964), provides that the SEC may require a statement from the party under investigation concerning the facts and circumstances surrounding the suspected violations.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(b) (1964). The subpoena required production of the
following documents relating to the business of the Wall Street Transcript Corporation
during the period from Jan. 1, 1967, to the present: (1) copies of all advertisements,
notices, circulars, newspaper articles, and any other writing used in connection with
the sale of the Wall Street Transcript; (2) all correspondence with subscribers and
prospective subscribers of the Wall Street Transcript; and (3) all documents, agreements, memoranda, correspondence, and any other writings relating or containing
reference to the obtaining of reports, comments, management speeches, and any other
written materials for publication in the Wall Street Transcript.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a) (11) (D) (1964), states in pertinent part: "Investment
adviser . . . does not include . . . the publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news
magazine or business or financial publication of general and regular circulation. . ...

(517)
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press guaranteed by the first amendment. 6 Upon petition to enforce the
subpoena 7 the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York denied the SEC's motion, holding that where a publisher, who
is presumptively entitled to the protection of the first amendment, can
make a virtually unrebutted showing that it is a bona fide financial news
publication, a federal court should determine the issue of "coverage"
rather than the administrative agency. SEC v. Wall Street Transcript
Corp., 294 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
It is well settled that Congress can empower an administrative agency,
incident to its proper functions, to conduct investigations and to compel
testimony and the production of evidence. 8 As early as 1894 the United
States Supreme Court in ICC v. Brimson9 established that actions for
the enforcement of an administrative subpoena were "a legitimate exertion
of judicial authority in a case or controversy to which . . . the judicial

power of the United States extends."'1 Since that time two questions
have plagued the courts: (1) whether the agency is required to establish
a probable violation of its act to have the subpoena enforced and (2)
whether a court or the agency should determine whether the person or
corporation served was within the scope of the agency's jurisdiction."
6. SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 294 F. Supp. 298, 302 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). The specific allegations of respondent were
that the SEC [had] no jurisdiction to investigate its affairs or to issue the subpoena; that the subpoena was and is not authorized by the Act; that the investigation and issuance of the subpoena are not within the power of Congress to
authorize; and that the subpoena in any case is unnecessarily broad, coercive,
harassing and in derogation of the First and Fourth Amendment rights of
the respondent.
Id.

7. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(c) (1964), provides that:

In case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to, any person,

the Commission may invoke the aid of any court of the United States . . . in
requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books,
papers . . . and other records. And such court may issue an order requiring
such .. .and any failure to obey such order . . .may be punished by such court

as a contempt thereof.

8. CAB v. Hermann, 264 U.S. 298 (1924); Smith v. ICC, 245 U.S. 33 (1917);
United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318 (1915) ; ICC v. Goodrich
Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194 (1912) ; Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1908) ; Burton v.
United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906) ; see Note, Discovery in Federal Administrative
Proceedings, 16 STAN. L. Rtv. 1035, 1039 (1964).
For examples of other agencies empowered to conduct investigations, see
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 50 (1964) ; Securities and Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(u) (1964); National Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(o) (1964);
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825 (1964) ; National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 161 (1964) ; Interstate Commerce Commission Act, 49 U.S.C. § 12 (1964)
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. § 1484 (1964).
9. 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
10. Id. at 489. The court reasoned that:
The present proceeding is not merely ancillary and advisory .... The proceeding
is one for determining rights arising out of specified matters in dispute that concern both the general public and the individual defendants. It is one in which a
judgment may be rendered that will be conclusive upon the parties. ...
Id. at 487 (emphasis added). Accord, ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1904).

11. 1 K. DAvis,

ADMINISTRATIVS

LAw TREATISE

§ 3.12, at 216-17 (1958).

On

probable cause, compare FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1924),
where the Supreme Court per Mr. Justice Holmes dismissed an FTC application for
enforcement of a subpoena on the ground that there was no showing of probable
cause, with Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384, 390 (7th Cir.), cert.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/8
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Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Endicott Johnson Corp. v.
Perkins,12 there were three approaches to the jurisdiction of lower federal
courts to handle the coverage question. The court could: (1) take evidence and decide the issue itself ;13 or (2) inquire only into the probable
legal justification of the subpoena ;14 or (3) refuse to consider the question of coverage and accept the agency's determination unless the information sought was clearly irrelevant. 15 In Endicott the Court adopted
the last position in enforcing a subpoena pursuant to the Walsh-Healey
Public Contracts Act. 16 Since the Court in Endicott relied heavily on
the language of the Act,' 7 the lower courts questioned the scope of the
decision ;18 however, in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,"9 the
Supreme Court established the general applicability of the rule in Endicott,
reasoning that the right of an agency to police its act and protect the
public outweighed any possible infringement of an individual's right of
20
privacy resulting from a lack of prior judicial intervention.
The Oklahoma Press decision also firmly established that probable
cause of suspected statutory violations need not be shown by the agency
seeking enforcement of its order. The Court adopted a rationale later
expressly articulated

in

United States v. Morton Salt Co.,2 1 which

analogized the agency to a grand jury, whose function is to determine
denied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940), where the court held that an agency can subpoena records
regardless of whether probable cause has been shown. On coverage, compare FTC v.
Claire Furnace Co., 285 F. 936 (D.C. Cir. 1923), rev'd on other grounds, 274 U.S. 160
(1927), with General Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 125 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1942).
12. 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
13. See, e.g., General Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 125 F.2d 596 (6th Cir.
1942); FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 285 F. 936 (D.C. Cir. 1923), rev'd on other
grounds, 274 U.S. 160 (1927) ; FTC v. P. Lorillard Co., 283 F. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1922),
aff'd on other grounds, 264 U.S. 298 (1924). For critical commentary on early FTC
cases where the courts decided the coverage issue, see MacChesney & Murphy,
Investigatory and Enforcement Powers of the Federal Trade Commission, 8 Gvo.
WASH. L. Riv. 581, 585-86, 593-94 (1940).
14. This doctrine was confined primarily to the third circuit and was followed
even after the Endicott decision. See Walling v. News Printing Co., 148 F.2d 57 (3d
Cir. 1945), aff'd sub nom. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186 (1946).
15. In President v. Skeen, 118 F.2d 58, 59 (1941), the court held: "[the Board's]
officers would not be bound by the denial of any person . . . that he was engaged in
interstate commerce. The Board has a right to make its own investigation to determine the fact." See, e.g., Cudahy Packing Co. v. Fleming, 119 F.2d 209 (5th Cir.
1941) ; Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 690 (1940). See also 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 220.
16. 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1964). Section 39 requires corporations dealing with the
government to meet certain labor standards designated by the Department of Labor.
17. 317 U.S. at 507-08.
18. Compare Walling v. La Belle S.S. Co., 148 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1945), with
Martin Typewriter Co. v. Walling, 135 F.2d 918 (1st Cir. 1943).
19. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
20. Id. at 213. See Davis, The Administrative Power of Investigation, 56 YALS
L.J. 1111, 1112 (1947). But see Mitchell v. Truck Drivers Local 299, 191 F. Supp.
229, 233 (E.D. Mich. 1961), where the court refused to extend Oklahoma Press to a
subpoena which was overbroad.
21. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1969

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1969], Art. 8
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14

whether such probable cause exists. 22 In 1964 the Supreme Court in
United States v. Powel 28 established the present guidelines for judicial
inquiry in suits to enforce agency subpoenas. If the investigation is pursuant to a legitimate purpose and the information sought by the subpoena
is unknown to the agency and relevant to such legitimate purpose the
subpoena must be enforced unless to do so would be a violation of the
court's process - namely, when the agency was seeking information for
24
an improper purpose or to harass the person or corporation served.
The Transcriptcourt was faced with a unique problem. The principal
case previously dealing with coverage in a first amendment area, Oklahoma Press, was an action to enforce a subpoena duces tecum against
a newspaper to acquire information concerning the wages and hours of
the defendant company's employees pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act.28 The Supreme Court rejected a first amendment argument, holding
that the wages and hours legislation was designed to effectuate commerce

and although the investigation was directed at a publisher there was no
actual restraint on free expression.2 6
In the instant case, by contrast, the investigation was directed at
the content of the publication, and disclosure of the information sought
22. Id. at 642-43. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 449 (1960)

(comparing

the Civil Rights Commission to a grand jury with respect to determining violation of
constitutional rights) ; Consolidated Mines v. SEC, 97 F.2d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 1938)
Woolley v. United States, 97 F.2d 258, 262 (9th Cir. 1938).
23. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
24. Id. at 57-58. This exception eliminates the fears expressed by Mr. Justice
Murphy, dissenting in Endicott, that
if they [the administrators] are freed of all restraint upon inquisitorial activities
and are allowed uncontrolled discretion in the exercise of the sovereign power
of government to invade private affairs through the use of the subpoena . . .
under the direction of well-meaning but overzealous officials they may at times
become instruments of intolerable oppression and injustice.
317 U.S. at 510.
The criterion of relevancy has usually been construed in the agency's favor.
Cooper, Federal Agency Investigations: Requirements for the Production of Documents, 60 MicIH. L. Rtv. 187, 190-92 (1962). See Jackson Packing Co. v. NLRB,
204 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1953). But see Hermann v. CAB, 237 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir.
1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 322 (1957), where the court held that "to have the subpoena
enforced, the issue as to whether each of the documents subpoenaed is relevant and
material is a judicial question. .. ."
25. 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1964).
26. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 193 (1946).
Accord, Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) ; Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937). See Barsk v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
Where the limitation of expression has been direct the courts have reached
a contrary conclusion. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (forbidding
the taxation of pamphleteers); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)
(holding that door-to-door solicitation is privileged) ; Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938) (holding that pamphleteers could not be made to take out a license).
See also United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953), where the Supreme Court
stated in dicta:
[T]he power to inquire into all efforts of private individuals to influence public
opinion through books and periodicals . . . raises doubts of constitutionality in
view of the prohibition of the First Amendment.
Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion specifically addressed himself to the
constitutional issue and found that a congressional investigation aimed at discovering
the names and addresses of persons purchasing books was violative of the first
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/8
amendment. Id. at 57-58.
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could result in an inhibitory effect on the publication and editorial policy
of Transcript. 27 The subpoena instituted by the SEC in the instant case
sought the names of subscribers and advertisers. If these parties were
called as witnesses or notified of the investigation it is conceivable that
they may have ceased their financial support of Transcript. Furthermore,
unlike the Fair Labor Standards Act involved in Oklahoma Press, the
Investment Advisers Act is a licensing statute, which if directly applied
to a newspaper would raise significant constitutional problems.2 8 It therefore seems that the threatened inhibitory effect on free press coupled
with the regulatory nature of the Act would itself constitute a valid basis
for distinguishing the instant case from Oklahoma Press and other prior
coverage cases.
It therefore appears that protection of the pre-eminent position of
the first amendment would justify the need for a judicial rather than
an administrative decision. 2 9 In Dombrowski v. Pfister30 the Supreme
Court recognized that where a threat of criminal prosecution under a
potentially unconstitutional statute creates "a chilling effect" on the exercise of first amendment rights the federal courts should not abstain
from deciding the case pending state court decision. 3' The Court reasoned
that although federal courts normally recognize the right of the state to
protect its citizens prior to federal intervention, when the mere existence
of a statute itself creates an unconstitutional suppression of first amendment rights the Court must intervene to assure prompt relief.8 2 This
reasoning is analogous to the reasoning employed in the instant decision.
33
Moreover, in an analogous area involving the Selective Service Act
a result similar to that in the instant case was reached by the Second
27. See the classic case of Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931), where
the Supreme Court held:
In determining the extent of the constitutional protection [of the press], it has
been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the
guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication.
See also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245-46 (1936).
28. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). See also Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), where the Supreme Court stated: "The freedom of
speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at least the liberty
to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous
restraint or fear of subsequent punishment." Id. at 488, quoting Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940). See also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 (1936).
29. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963). See generally Note, Federal-QuestionAbstention: Justice Frankfurter's
Doctrine in the Activist Era, 80 HARV. L. REv. 604 (1967) ; Note, Constitutional
Law: Limitations Imposed on Traditional Use of Doctrine of Federal Judicial Absten-

tion, 1966 Duicr L.J. 219.
30. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
31. Id. at 489-90. On threat of prosecution, see Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58 (1963) ; Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961) ; Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
32. 380 U.S. at 485. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
50 U.S.C.
§§ 451-73
Published by33.Villanova
University
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Circuit in Wolff v. Selective Serv. Bd.34 The court in Wolff relied heavily
on the reasoning of Dombrowski and reversed the draft reclassification
of two war protesters prior to their exhaustion of administrative remedies
under the Act because complainants' first amendment rights had been
violated. The court stated that while it is
[n]ormally . . . desirable not only that the administration function
with a minimum of judicial interference but also that, when the administration does err, it [will] be free to work out its own problems.
[w]hen . . . a serious threat to the exercise of First Amend-

ment rights exists, the policy favoring the preservation of these
rights must prevail.35
In deciding a coverage question, generally the interest in allowing the administrative agency to correct its own errors would normally prevail. 36
However, as in the instant case, where the investigation may in itself result in violations of the first amendment it appears that under the rationale
espoused in Dombrowski and Wolff a court by allowing an administrative
body to keep its primary jurisdiction, would be violating its constitutional
duty. Furthermore, if the Supreme Court in the Powell decision could
find an abuse of the court's process in enforcing a subpoena where there
is harassment or an illegitimate purpose, it seems clear that accession
to a violation of guaranteed first amendment freedoms would create a
greater abuse. 87
Once the Transcript court established its authority on constitutional
grounds, it further differentiated the instant case from prior decisions
on the statutory ground that newspapers are specifically excluded from
the purview of the Investment Advisers Act. This statutory distinction,
however, seems superfluous to its finding that the court should determine
coverage. The exclusion of newspapers by section 202 of the Act is only
a valid basis for the court's final determination that Transcript was not in
fact covered by the Act and does not lend persuasive support for establishing primary jurisdiction on the issue of coverage. This is especially
true since prior decisions have held that lack of probable coverage is
no reason to deny enforcement of a subpoena. In Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp.,a8 the Supreme Court held that a court may not en34. 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
35. Id. at 825. This is consonant with the statement of Judge Magruder that:
This doctrine [of exhaustion of remedies] had its origin in a discretionary rule
adopted by courts of equity to the effect that a petitioner will be denied equitable
relief when he has failed to pursue an available administrative remedy by which
he might obtain the same relief.
Smith v. United States, 199 F.2d 377, 381 (lst Cir. 1952). See Jaffe, The Exhaustion
of Administrative Remedies, 12 BUFFALO L. Rtv. 327 (1962).
36. The court in Wolff was engaged in the process of balancing the rights of
the individual to prompt redress of grievances against the right of an agency to police
its act.
37. The first amendment's preeminent position would seem more important than
simple harassment on the part of an agency.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/8
38. 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
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join the National Labor Relations Board from conducting a hearing upon
a complaint alleging unfair labor practices even if the company was not
subject to the Act. The Court reasoned that the proper forum for proving
that the company was beyond the Board's jurisdiction is the Board it9
self or a court of appeals on review of the administrative decision.3 It
would seem, therefore, that the existence of the statutory exclusion would
only be a basis for deciding the factual issue of coverage after the court
had established its duty to take primary jurisdiction; and only the incipient
first amendment violation provides a valid basis for establishing such a
40
duty.
On the basis of the evidence the court decided that Transcript was
a newspaper and excluded from the coverage of the Investment Advisers
Act.41 Although an agency has been analogized to a grand jury when
it investigates suspected violations of its Act and has usually been granted
enforcement of subpoenas upon a mere allegation of some reason to
believe a violation had occurred,4 2 the rationale behind this ruling becomes unpersuasive when irreparable first amendment damage may result
from conducting the investigation. 48 Since the SEC failed to introduce
39. Id. at 49-50. For a contrary result see Crafts v. FTC, 244 F.2d 882, 890
(9th Cir. 1957), where the court stated that since the Commission was seeking
affirmative relief it must establish affirmatively its powers to act in the field. The
decision was reversed per curiam on appeal, FTC v. Crafts, 355 U.S. 9 (1957), with a
mere citation to Endicott and Oklahoma Press.
40. An alternative line of reasoning could have been used to support the court's
conclusion. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that subpoenas
should only be enforced by the courts when they are in "accordance with law."
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1005(c) (1964). Given the specific exclusion of newspapers in the Investment Advisers Act, it can be argued that the
issuance of the instant subpoena was not in accordance with law and should not be
enforced. Two fifth circuit decisions have rejected this argument, holding that the
APA created no change in their existing jurisdiction in coverage cases. Tobin v.
Banks & Rumbaugh, 201 F.2d 223 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 942 (1953);
D.G. Bland Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 177 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1949). However, these
decisions did not deal with possible first amendment violations. The presence of this
issue would create a violation of the constitution as well as statute. Thus, it would
appear that "in accordance with law" could take on additional significance and provide
a valid basis for a "pre-mature" decision on the coverage issue.
41. The court emphasized the important news functions of Transcript, finding:
A typical issue of the Transcript includes reports issued by brokerage houses on
various securities, news of offerings of bonds and stocks, speeches made by corporate, financial and government personages, news concerning name changes of
companies, news concerning executive promotions and transfers, news concerning
mergers and acquisitions and editorials on various subjects with, it would appear,
principal emphasis on financial and economic matters.
294 F. Supp. at 304 (emphasis added).
42. See Goldberg v. Truck Drivers Local 299, 293 F.2d 807, 812 (6th Cir. 1961)
FTC v. Scientific Living, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 495, 499 (M.D. Pa. 1957).
43. Inconvenience in itself has never been a sufficient basis to deny enforcement
of a subpoena. See, e.g., Westside Ford, Inc. v. United States, 206 F.2d 627 (9th Cir.
1953); Application of Compton, 101 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Tex. 1951). However,
irreparable damage has been allowed as a defense where the damage has been less
substantial than that which would result from first amendment violations. See, e.g.,
Chapman v. Maren Elwood College, 225 F.2d 230, 232 (9th Cir. 1955) (enforcement
denied because of its harassing nature on respondents) ; FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp.
899, 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (subpoena asking trade secrets modified to prevent irreparable burden on respondent) ; NLRB v. Pesante, 119 F. Supp. 444, 458-59 (S.D.
Cal. 1954) (enforcement modified as to time and date due to irreparable harm).
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any substantial evidence to rebut the presumption that Transcript was a
newspaper, the court was forced to deny enforcement for lack of probable cause.
Moreover, the fact that the potential irreparable harm to the respondent in the instant case requires a prior judicial determination is
consistent with the rationale in some declaratory judgment, injunction,
and mandamus cases seeking to halt administrative actions. In Eccles
v. Peoples Bank, 44 the Supreme Court, denying a petition for declaratory
judgment, stated:
A determination of administrative authority . . . may be made at

the behest of one so immediately and truly injured by a regulation
claimed to be invalid, that his need is sufficiently compelling to justify
judicial intervention even before the completion of the administrative
process. 45
Since such a defense has been allowed in administrative cases prior to
an exhaustion of remedies under injunction, mandamus, or declaratory
judgment proceedings 40 there seems to be no valid reason not to have
the same defense against the enforcement of a subpoena.
The interesting question left open by the Transcript decision is what
"quantum of evidence" the SEC is required to present to rebut the presumption that a publication like Transcript is a newspaper. The court's
opinion intimates that there must be enough evidence to establish probable
cause but does not indicate how this burden would be met. Obviously the
SEC would have to show evidence of more than financial news, the publishing or specific stock analyses, and advertisements by the publisher
tending to show that the newspaper would be a helpful tool for investors
since such proof was insufficient in the instant case. 47 The minimum
requirement seems to be a showing of independent analysis and advice
on the part of the publication. The Transcript court did indicate that
it would allow limited enforcement of a narrowly drawn subpoena and
would in this limited way aid the agency with the investigation. In this
respect, however, the court intimated that judicial intervention through
injunctive proceedings would be appropriate if a violation of first amendment rights becomes apparent during the proceedings.
The effect of the principal case is, therefore, to extend first amendment protection to publishers prior to an agency investigation. Since
the fifth amendment does not apply to corporations 48 and the fourth
44. 333 U.S. 426 (1948).
45. Id. at 434. See Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 363-65 (1943). On injunction procedure, see Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). Cf. Pacific Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196 (1924) ; Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252
U.S. 331 (1920) ; Wadley Southern Ry. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651 (1915). On mandamus procedure, see Whitehouse v. Illinois Central R.R., 349 U.S. 366, 374 (1955).
46. See note 43 supra.
47. 294 F. Supp. at 304-05.
48. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 726 (1944);
Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 158 (1923); Wilson v. United States,
221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/8
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amendment is only applicable, if at all, in areas where the subpoena is
overly broad, 49 the scope of the instant decision, as applied to corporations seems limited to prospective first amendment violations, ° Since
the first amendment issue does not seem generally applicable to other
agencies because their contracts with publishers are in areas only indirectly
affecting free expression, there would be few factual situations to which
the Transcript rationale could be applied. 51 The opinion is further limited
since under the court's standard of a "virtually unrebutted showing" of
being a newspaper, the court would not have many occasions to deny
coverage to the agency. The instant case, therefore, would not affect the
SEC's right to investigate investment sheets which had "issued or promulgated" original analysis of specific companies, because apparently no
presumption that the respondent would be a newspaper could be raised.
The Transcript court, faced with a unique situation, has followed
the advice of a respected commentator and limited the investigatory power
of an agency in light of special circumstances that outweigh the general
desirability of the agency deciding the issue of coverage. 52 The decision
reflects a desirable balance between first amendment rights and the need
for an agency to police its acts. In striking this new balance the court
has followed its duty under the constitution by deciding an issue more properly within judicial competence as a protector of constitutional freedoms.
Robert A. Ebenstein

49. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 375-76 (1911) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 75-76 (1906). See Note, The Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the Visitorial
Power of Congress over State Corporations,30 COLUm. L. Rzv. 103 (1930).
50. As applied to individuals, the fifth amendment has long been available as
protection and the fourth has been applicable only where the subpoena is too broad.
On the fifth amendment defense, see Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126
(1959), where the Supreme Court stated that "the protections of the First Amendment, unlike a proper claim of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment, do not afford a witness the right to resist inquiry in all circumstances."
On fourth amendment defenses, see Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327

U.S. at 186, 202-03 (1946).
51. Most commissions and agencies are engaged in regulation of various types of

corporations as to how they conduct their businesses in an economic sense. Therefore
their investigations are generally aimed at the wages and hours they pay (Fair Labor
Standards Act), their methods of competition (Sherman Anti-Trust Act), how they
report their earnings (Securities and Exchange Act), and how they bargain with
their employees (NLRB). None of these situations are generally regarded as a direct
limitation on first amendment freedoms even where the corporation investigated is a
publisher. If broadcasting companies are to be considered as protected by the first
amendment, then the action of the Federal Communication Commission regulating
programming might be governed by the instant decision.
52, Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of Review, 79 HARv.
L. Rzv. 914, 920 (1966).
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ANTITRUST

-

EXCHANGE OF PRICE INFORMATION -

THE EXCHANGE

OF SPECIFIC INFORMATION AMONG SELLERS AS TO THE LATEST PRICE
CHARGED OR QUOTED TO INDIVIDUAL CUSTOMERS PURSUANT TO AN
INFORMAL AGREEMENT

IS

A VIOLATION OF SECTION

1

OF THE SHER-

MAN ACT.

United States v. Container Corp. of America (U.S. 1969)
Defendants, 18 corrugated container manufacturers who controlled
90 percent of the corrugated container market in the southeastern United
States, informally agreed to the mutual exchange of price information
as to the most recent price charged or quoted to identified customers in
particular transactions.' The United States Department of Justice initiated a civil antitrust suit in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina alleging that the exchange of specific
price information constituted a price fixing agreement which was a per
se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 2 The district court rejected
the government's contention and dismissed the complaint.3 On direct
appeal, 4 the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exchange of specific information among sellers as to the price charged individual customers, pursuant to a mutual agreement is a violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393
U.S. 333 (1969).
Although section 1 of the Sherman Act specifies that "[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade .

.

.

."r

is

illegal, the courts have narrowed this seemingly absolute ban by applying
a rule of reason approach which condemns as illegal only those activities
which result in an unreasonable restraint of trade "either because of
their inherent nature or effect or because of the evident purpose of the
acts .

.

. ."

In a rule of reason inquiry, the court approaches each case

on an individual basis, analyzing whether the purpose and effect of the
allegedly illegal behavior under the circumstances results in an unreason1. Typically, a defendant would contact another manufacturer either to ascertain
the price which the latter had charged or quoted to a specific customer or to confirm
the price which the former had obtained from the customer. In all cases, the information was supplied upon request only. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 273
F. Supp. 18, 21-58 (M.D.N.C. 1967).
2. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), provides in relevant part:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal ......
3. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 273 F. Supp. 18, 67-68 (M.D.N.C.
1967).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964), requires direct appeal to the United States Supreme
Court from a final judgment of a district court in any civil action wherein the United
States is the complainant.
5. The Supreme Court has never differentiated between a contract, combination
or conspiracy in this context and the terms are therefore used interchangeably.
6. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911). The
classic statement of the rule of reason is found in Mr. Chief Justice White's majority
opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60-65 (1911). See also
United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 386-87 (1956).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/8
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able restraint of trade. 7 Gradually, it became apparent that a rule of reasonable approach was not appropriate in all cases because certain types of
behavior, due to their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtues, consistently resulted in unreasonable restraints of trade.
Consequently, the courts presumed these activities to be unreasonable and
henceforth illegal per se8 without elaborate inquiry into the precise harm
caused or the asserted business justifications for their use. 9 In the landmark
decision of United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 10 the Supreme Court
established price fixing as a per se violation of section 1,11 holding that
7. For a general discussion of the application of the rule of reason, see G.

STOCKING, WORKABLE

COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST

POLICY

126-44 (1961); 1 H.

TOULMiN, ANTITRUST LAWS OF TlE UNITED STATES 200-01, 208-09, 211 (1949);

Adams, The "Rule of Reason": Workable Competition or Workable Monopoly?, 63
YALE L.J. 348-61 (1954); Handler, Development of the Rule of Reason, 10 ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION 21 (1957) ; Loevinger, Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA.
L. REv. 23 (1964).

8. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See also Walker
Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 178 (1965) ; White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) ; Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers
Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 748 n.9 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817
(1954). For a general discussion, see C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY
142-48 (1959) ; Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. Rv.
1165 (1964).
The list of activities which have been characterized as illegal per se include
the following: price fixing, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
223 (1940) ; division of markets, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F.
271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) ; group boycotts, Fashion Originators'
Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); tying arrangements, International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), and certain sales commission systems
for the marketing of tires, batteries, and accessories by service stations affiliated with
major oil companies, FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
9. Generally, a per se violation cannot be justified on the grounds that it was
imperative to avoid ruinous competition, that the prices set were reasonable, or that
the defendants, although violating the per se rule, did not have sufficient control over
the market to cause an unreasonable restraint of trade. United States v. New Wrinkle,
Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 377 (1952) ; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 212-18 (1940) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).

See Rahl, Price Competition and the Price Fixing Rule

-

Preface and Perspective,

57 Nw. U.L. REv. 137, 141-42 (1962); Comment, The Per Se Illegality of Price
Fixing - Sons Power, Purpose, or Effect, 19 U. CHI. L. Rv. 837 (1952).
A per se rule, however, is not absolute. At its origin is the rebuttable inference or presumption that the only possible intent of the defendants was the accom-

plishment of an anticompetitive act thereby constituting a violation. The doctrine of

ancillary restraints, first enunciated in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), provides one form of effective
rebuttal to this presumption. The doctrine was expressed in United States v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), as follows:
Where challenged conduct is subservient or ancillary to a transaction which is
itself legitimate, the decision is not determined by a per se rule. The doctrine of

ancillary restraints is to be applied. It permits, as reasonable, a restraint which

(1) is reasonably necessary to the legitimate primary purpose of the arrangement,
and of no broader scope than reasonably necessary; (2) does not unreasonably
affect competition in the marketplace; and (3) is not imposed by a party or
parties with monopoly power.
See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 549, 556 (E.D. Pa. 1960),

aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) ; Van Cise, supra note 8, at 1173-74.
10. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
11. Price fixing is one of the most common forms of antitrust violation. E.
KINTER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 31-37 (1964). Prior to Socony, the Court recognized
the inherent competitive evil in every price fixing agreement. See United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). For a general discussion of the Court's
approach to price fixing agreements, see Peppin, Price-Fixing Agreements Under the

Anti-trust
Law,
28 CALIV.
L. REv.
297, Digital
667 (1940).
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"a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
12
interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se. '
Two elements are essential in order to establish a violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act - a conspiracy' 3 and an unreasonable restraint of
trade. 14 In the instant case, neither Justices Douglas, Fortas, nor Marshall,
writing the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions respectively,
questioned the existence of an implied agreement under the criteria of
section 1.15 Although there was no formal agreement, 6 the reciprocal and
12. 310 U.S. at 223.
13. An express agreement is not necessary to establish the existence of a Sherman
Act conspiracy. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1966) ;
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). A tacit agreement
may be inherent in a given course of conduct and whether an unlawful conspiracy is
proved is to be judged by what the parties actually did rather than by the words they
used. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960). Any conformance
to an agreed or contemplated pattern of conduct will warrant an inference of conspiracy. United States v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 137 F. Supp. 78, 85 (S.D.
Cal. 1961). A conspiracy is inherent in any concerted performance which results in
an unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore the government must only establish
the restraint. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 195 (1963). Moreover, it is immaterial whether conspiracy is achieved by agreement, tacit understanding,
or by "acquiescense . . . coupled with assistance in effectuating its purpose ...
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723 (1944).
The practical need for the ability to imply a combination or conspiracy is
grounded in the fact that the government is usually without the aid of direct testimony
in restraint of trade cases; hence the strong reliance on circumstantial evidence.
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1938) ; Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1958), aff'd, 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
It has been emphasized that an inference of a conspiracy must be drawn from relevant
and competent evidence. Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir.
1965). See, e.g., Daily v. United States, 282 F.2d 818, 820 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Pevely
Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363, 369 (8th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
942 (1950) (mere uniformity of prices in the sale of a standardized commodity was
not in itself evidence of a violation of the Sherman Act). For a general discussion
of the problems of establishing a conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act, see
J. ScoTT & E. ROCKEFELLER, ANTITRUST AND TRADs REGULATION TODAY 1-5 (1966) ;
Curtis, Problems of Proof in Sherman Act Conspiracy Cases, 23 Bus. LAW. 231
(1967) ; Galgay, Antitrust Considerations in the Exchange of Price Information
Among Competitors, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 617, 618 (1963) ; Hale, Agreements among
Competitors - Incidental and Reasonable Restraints of Trade, 33 MINN. L. Rv. 331
(1949) ; Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-trust Laws, 44 ILL. L. Rgv. 743 (1950).
14. See notes 6 & 7 supra. A basic difference between a per se and a rule of
reason approach is that in the former the unreasonable restraint of trade is presumed
once a conspiracy to commit the previously decided illegal act is established, whereas
in the latter an unreasonable restraint of trade is not presumed and must be established
by evidence on the record.
15. The Court distinguishes the conduct in the instant case from that in a conscious
parallelism situation where the existence of an agreement, combination, or conspiracy
cannot be implied merely because two competitors knowingly act in the same manner.
In Container Corp. there was actually collaboration between two or more co-conspirators, whereas in the latter situation there is no collaboration. See United States
v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 335 n.2; Brief for Appellant at 19-20,
United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969). For examples and
discussion of the conscious parallelism concept, see Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954) ; Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); United States v. National Malleable & Steel Castings
Co., 1957 TRAD4 CAs. 73,580 (N.D. Ohio 1957), aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 38 (1958) ;
Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism
and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. Rgv. 655 (1962) ; Comment, Developments in the
Law of Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. Rzv. 920, 1005 (1959).
16. See note 13 supra.
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interdependent nature of the price exchange with each defendant acquiescing in requests for information in expectation of receiving a similar courtesy and, conversely, each recipient tacitly affirming his willingness to
17
cooperate with his competitor was sufficient to establish an agreement.
The more fundamental problem faced by the Court was in classifying
the mere exchange of price information as an unreasonable restraint of
trade either under a rule of reason analysis or as a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. The government, seeking adjudication on a per se basis,
argued that the exchange of price information between competitors was
merely another species of price fixing and that any "concerted activity
aimed at limiting price competition or tampering with the price structure
is unlawful per se .

.

. even if the limitation upon price competition may

be indirect."18 Taking a realistic and practical view of the real effects
of exchanging current price information, it advanced a cogent argument
that knowledge of a competitor's price would clearly influence a businessman's pricing decisions despite the absence of any specific agreement,' 9
and that the effect of such knowledge would be to consistently confine the
range of prices in the industry within a narrow ambit. Such an inevitable
result they concluded warranted the application of a per se rule.
Because of the ambiguity of the majority opinion, it is arguable that
Mr. Justice Douglas accepted the government's contention because nothing
in the majority opinion expressly negates such a reading and the Court
seems to establish a relationship between the Socony decision and the
instant case. 20 However, a more reasonable and logical reading suggests
that Mr. Justice Douglas utilized the traditional rule of reason approach
rather than a per se one. The thrust of the Court's decision is to condemn
the activity of exchanging price information only if it has the effect of
"keeping prices within a fairly narrow ambit." 2' Moreover, in an attempt
to prevent any ambiguity, Mr. Justice Fortas, concurring, specifically re17. The facts that the price exchanges were infrequent and irregular, that
defendants were free to withdraw from participation without sanctions, and that most
of the data was available from the customers themselves were not considered sufficient
evidence to negate the existence of an unlawful agreement. United States v. Container
Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. at 335.
18. Brief for Appellant at 13, United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S.
333 (1969) (emphasis added), citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S.
127, 147-48 (1966) and United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-23,
224 n.59 (1940).
19. A businessman's primary objective is to maximize profits by charging the
highest price possible which does not exceed the prices charged by his competitors.
If he is aware of his competitors' price, he will not minimize his prices in fear of being
undersold, but rather will maximize his prices using his competitor's price as a ceiling.
Therefore, the natural effect of this type of knowledge is to stabilize prices at an
upward level. Brief for Appellant at 28-33, United States v. Container Corp. of Am.,
393 U.S. 333 (1969).
20. 393 U.S. at 337.
21. Id. at 336. Appellant emphasized the fact the defendants did not necessarily
have to fix a specific price level because "restricting the range of competition by
minimizing price cuts" is in effect tampering with the price structure. Brief for Appellant at 33, United States v. Container Corp. of Am.-- -.U.S. -_ (1969). See United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 221-23; Plymouth Dealers' Ass'n v.
States,University
279 F.2dCharles
128 (9th
Cir. School
1960). of Law Digital Repository, 1969
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pudiates any contentions that the majority opinion establishes a new per
se violation. 22 In addition, both Mr. Justice Fortas and Mr. Justice
Marshall, dissenting, rejected the application of a per se rule to the
exchange of price information since such activity neither necessarily
leads to price stabilization 23 nor is so inherently harmful or so devoid
of potential benefit.2 4 The validity of this non-per se interpretation is
supported by the majority's consistent reliance on analogous trade association cases 25 which have previously applied the rule of reason approach
and by the actual language and tenor of the majority opinion.
On previous occasions, the Court has concluded that the exchange of
price information between competitors could either aid or restrain the
competitive process depending upon the type of information involved
and the purpose and effect of the exchange.2 6 For example, in Maple
Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 27 the Supreme Court expressly

negated the appropriateness of a per se rule by declaring that
[t]he unlawfulness of the combination arose not from the fact that
the defendants had effected a combination to gather and disseminate
information, but from the fact that the court inferred from the
peculiar circumstances of each case that concerted action had resulted, or would necessarily 28result, in tending arbitrarily to lessen
production or increase prices.

In these analogous cases the Court, by applying a rule of reason inquiry,
was extremely sensitive to the facts of each case and attempted to ascertain the underlying intent of the parties by examining the type of information exchanged in relationship to its relevance in establishing a restraint
of trade. Applying this test, the Court has weighed heavily such factors
as whether the exchange dealt with average prices charged or specific
22. 393 U.S. at 338.

23. Id. at 339. Mr. Justice Fortas contends that the exchange of price information
in the instant case merely "suggests the probability" that it will effect the pricing mechanism of the market place, a situation which does not warrant a per se classification.
24. Id. at 341.
25. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); Cement Mfrs.
Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925) ; Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n
v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) ; United States v. American Linseed Oil Co.,
262 U.S. 371 (1923) ; American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377
(1921). Although these cases involved the exchange of information through the use
of trade associations, the Court has impliedly recognized them as analogous situations.
United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
The instant case is apparently a unique situation. The exchange of information is neither clothed with a prima facie legality sometimes attached to trade associations generally, nor does the case involve specific agreements to fix prices. For a
general discussion of the trade association cases and their significance, see S. BARNES
& S. OPPENHEIN, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS

17-22 (1955); G.

LAMB &

S.

KITTELLE, TRADE ASSOCIATION LAW

60-70 (1956); Miron, Antitrust Implications of the Exchange of
Business Information, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 485, 486-96 (1965) ; Comment, Private
Lawmaking by Trade Associations, 62 HARV. L. REv. 1346, 1362-66 (1949) ; Comment,
AND

PRACTIcE

Trade Association Statistics and the Anti-trust Laws, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 380 (1951).
26. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 8, at 148-50; Turner, Cooperation

Among Competitors, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 865, 866 (1967).
27. 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
28. Id. at 585.
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prices charged particular customers and whether the prices pertained to
29
past, present, or future transactions.
Analytically, three classes of information exchange emerge from
these cases. Initially, where the exchange of general market information,
including prices, is for the purpose and has the effect of aiding in a better
understanding of general market conditions which in turn leads to more
informed individual business decisions, then, as the Court found in Maple
Flooring,"° the exchange has expedited the natural competitive market
process and is the very antithesis of anticompetitive behavior. A second
legitimate variation is where, as in Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v.
United States, 31 there is an exchange of specific information but it is
for the legitimate purpose of protecting the recipients against fraud. On
the other hand, where the exchange of information between competitors
32
is for the purpose of gaining control over the competitive market forces
29. Several authors have suggested ways of insuring the legality of an exchange
of price information between competitors: (a) establish a legitimate and proper need
and purpose of the exchange of information, (b) make all exchanges a matter of
record, (c) the exchange should not be kept secret and all information gathered
should be available to anyone who requests it, (d) the information should not be
overly detailed and it should be anonymized as much as possible, deleting mention of
specific names and transactions, (e) the information exchanged should be limited to
past or closed transactions with no discussion of future prices or transactions,
(f) avoid any group analysis of the data collected and discussion between the recipients
of the information, (g) avoid policing of the information given and penalties for
misinformation, and (h) avoid making participation or adherence to any of the prices
reported compulsory. G. LAMB & S. KITTULLU, supra note 25, at 68-70; Panel Discussion - New Theories of Price Conspiracy, 24 ABA ANTITRUST' SECTION 76,
105-06 (1964) ; Galgay, supra note 13, at 619-23; Miron, supra note 25, at 496-97.
30. 268 U.S. 563 (1925). Defendants exchanged information as to average
production costs and past prices with no reference to any specific transactions. The
Court held that this exchange did not interfere with the functioning of a competitive
market. See also Tag Mfrs. Institute v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949) (even
though there was an exchange of current prices, the exchange was lawful because
neither party agreed to adhere to them nor was there any appreciable effect on prices
in either direction after the plan was inaugurated) ; United States v. Ward Baking
Co., 243 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (since the exchange of price information
occurred after the prices had been independently set or were about to become effective,
the exchange was lawful) ; Turner, supra note 26, at 866.
31. 268 U.S. 588 (1925). Since buyer-contractors were given a contract price on
future cement deliveries to specific job sites which often proved lower than the future
market price of cement, the manufacturers kept each other informed as to each
buyer's actual requirements on the specific jobs to prevent contractors from ordering
more than required to take advantage of the lower than market prices. Also, information on buyers' credit, freight rates and statistical information as to production, stock,
and shipments was exchanged. These items fit more appropriately into the first class
discussed in note 30 supra.
32. In these situations the agreement is illegal because of its purpose. Typical of
this type of violation is United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371
(1923), where defendants exchanged information as to past prices, manufacturing and
marketing conditions, sales, buyers' credit, and freight tariffs in an attempt to establish
"open competition" which would "promote better and more safe, sane, and stable
conditions in the . . . industry .... ." Id. at 380. The Court held that these were
not the acts of true competitors and that the manifest purpose of the agreement was
to violate the Sherman Act. In Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553
(1936), defendants, attempting to rejuvenate the failing sugar industry, agreed to
announce all prices in advance of actual sales and to grant no discounts to any buyer.
The Court held that an agreement not to alter prices, once announced, was an illegal
price fixing agreement. See also Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 573
(10th Cir. 1956).
If an agreement with an illegal purpose is entered into, section 1 of the
Sherman Act has been violated. The fact that defendants lacked the market power
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or the natural tendency of the exchange would result in an unreasonable
restraint of trade, 3 the activity has been uniformily condemned.
In light of this background, there is little indication that the majority
in the instant case is seeking to establish a per se rule. Rather than overruling Cement Mfrs.34 and probably Maple Flooring,3 5 a natural consequence of adopting a per se rule, Mr. Justice Douglas factually distin7
guished these cases3 6 as well as Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States3
from the instant case, and further concluded that American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States" and United States v. American Linseed
Oil Co. 19 were analogous situations. 40 A strong inference may therefore
be drawn from the Court's analysis of these precedents that the majority
is merely extending the guidelines previously developed under the rule
of reason approach.
The majority opinion itself in Container Corp. is short and cursory,
and this would be rather unusual if the Court were announcing a new
rule overturning 50 years of precedent. Substantively, the majority appears to reject the idea that the exchange of price information inevitably
leads to price stabilization within an industry - a necessary prerequisite
to the pronouncement of a per se rule. Although stating that "[t]he
result of this reciprocal exchange of prices was to stabilize prices [and]
. . . [k]nowledge of a competitor's price usually meant matching that
price," 41 the Court later stated that "[p]rice information exchanged in
some markets may have no effect on a truly competitive price."'42 The
use of the above language indicates that its condemnation of the exchange
to effectuate the restraint of trade is irrelevant. United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59; Rahl, supra note 9, at 141.
33. In these situations, the agreement is illegal because of its effect. Typical of
this type of violation is American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S.
377 (1921), where defendants exchaned information as to past prices, sales, produc-

tion, and inventory. All the data was then collated and future trends projected. The
Court found that these projections had the natural tendency of encouraging restraint
of production in an attempt by the recipients to maintain higher market prices. See
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914)
(the exchange between retailers of the names of wholesalers who sold directly to
consumers resulted in a boycott by the retailers of the listed wholesalers thereby
creating an unreasonable restraint of trade).
34. 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
35. 268 U.S. 563 (1925). In Maple Flooring, the information exchanged was of
a general nature. Therefore, if the Court adopts a narrow view of the holding in
Container Corp., it would apply only where there was an exchange of specific price
information thereby leaving the validity of Maple Flooring intact.
36. In Cement Mfrs., as opposed to the instant case, defendants were protecting
their legal rights. In Maple Flooring there was merely a statistical report on the
average costs of production without identifying parties to specific transactions as in
the instant case. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 334-35
(1969) ; Brief for Appellant at 38-40, id.
37. 297 U.S. 553 (1936). Although there was an exchange of price information
in both cases, in the instant case there was no agreement to adhere to the announced
prices as in Sugar Institute. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S.
333, 334 (1969).
38. 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
39. 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
40. 393 U.S. at 337.
41. Id. at 336-37.
42. Id. at 337.
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of price information was limited to the particular factual context in issue.
43
Furthermore, the Court carefully enumerated several economic factors
peculiar to the corrugated container industry which led the majority to
'44
find that "[t] he exchange of price data tends toward price uniformity.
The supply within this oligopolistic market was controlled by relatively
few manufacturers whose product was undifferentiated except as to price.
On the other hand, the demand was inelastic, with buyers forced to purchase cartons for their immediate needs regardless of the market price.
Within this context, "[p]rice [was] too critical, too sensitive a control to
'45
allow it to be used even in an informal manner to restrain competition,
especially where "[t]he inferences are irresistible that the exchange of
price information has had an anticompetitive effect in the industry, chilling
the vigor of price competition." 46 By focusing on these economic particulars, the majority appears to be applying a technique indicative of a rule
of reason approach. If the Court intended to enunciate a new per se rule
it would have been unnecessary to dwell on the economics of the situation
which are of no consequence in a per se analysis.
It may be argued that the majority relied on the Socony case to establish the basis of a new per se rule by drawing a nexus between Socony
and the instant case. The basis for this argument is the Court's statement that "It]he limitation or reduction of price competition brings the
case within the ban [of price fixing], for as we held in [Socony] . . .
interference with the setting of price by free market forces is unlawful
per se."' 4T It may be implied from this language that the exchange of
price information is a per se violation because it is merely a species of
price fixing. However, it appears that a more accurate construction of
the Court's language would lead to the conclusion that Container Corp.
was brought within the ban of Socony only because the exchange of price
information in this instance happened to lead to a limitation of price
competition.4 8 This interpretation is supported by a scrutiny of the activities involved. In this respect it is significant that the activities of price
fixing in Socony and the exchange of price information in Container
Corp. can be distinguished due to their completely different effects upon
the competitive process. In Socony, once the defendants removed the
distressed gasoline from the market as agreed,49 the natural competitive
forces brought about price stabilization. In Container Corp., the mere exchange of price information between defendants and nothing more would
& S.

43. For the effects of economic variable on a competitive market, see S. BARNS
OPP9NHtIN, supra note 25, at 318-42.

44. 393 U.S. at 337.

45. Id. at 338.
46. Id. at 337.
47. Id.
48. The fact that the actual prices in Container Corp. were stabilized at a downward level was of no consequence. Id. at 336.
49. Because independant dealers were flooding the market with surplus gasoline,
the major oil companies had a gentlemen's agreement to purchase the distressed
gasoline from the independants at a set price to remove it from the market; this
Published
by Villanova
University
Widger
of Law
Digital Repository,
resulted
in a decrease
in Charles
the supply
and,School
in effect,
supported
a higher 1969
price for gasoline.
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not necessarily lead to undesirable price stabilization. Any effect on price
was the result not of the exchange but of the manner in which the exchanged information was used.' ° In effect, the exchange of price information, unlike an agreement to fix prices, is not intrinsically anticompetitive and consequently will not always result in an unreasonable restraint of trade.
In considering the interests of the consuming public and competitors
which are to be protected, there appears to be no pressing need to depart
from the traditional rule of reason approach and to adopt a per se rule
in the area of exchanges of general or specific price information between
competitiors. As Mr. Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion indicates,
a per se rule is only appropriate when "the potential competitive harm
plus the administrative costs of determining in what particular situations
the practice may be harmful . . . far outweigh the benefits that may

result"5' 1 by not absolutely prohibiting the activity. In the exchange of
price information, the potential competitive harm is not self-evident. This
becomes apparent merely from observing the internal disagreement of the
Court in the instant case. The fact that the Court split six to three over
the issue of whether the exchange of price information resulted in an
unreasonable restraint of trade5 2 coupled with the majority's statement
that the exchange of price information in some markets would have no
effect on competition substantiates the absolute need for proof that the
complained of behavior actually results in an unreasonable restraint of
trade. It is suggested therefore that a rule of reason approach is more
appropriate than a per se rule in this area. From a procedural point of
view, a per se rule is inappropriate if one adopts the position that it is
the use of the exchanged information and not the exchange itself which
is anticompetitive. A correct approach would require the government to
demonstrate that prices were adversely affected in order to prove an illegal
use of the information. This inevitably results in a full rule of reason
inquiry. 3 From a practical viewpoint, recognizing that there could be a
legitimate business justification for the exchange 4 and that a violation
of the antitrust laws could result in criminal sanctions,5 5 it appears that
50. The Court distinguished the two cases on the same grounds that it distinguished Sugar Institute from the instant case. See note 37 supra. There was no
agreement in Container Corp. to adhere to a price schedule.
51. 393 U.S. at 341.
52. In the trade association cases previously discussed, the Court split over this
same issue on several occasions. See, for example, the dissenting opinion by Mr.
Justice McReynolds in Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563,
587 (1925) ;the dissenting opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Taft with Mr. Justice Sanford
in Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 606 (1925) (applied
to both Cement Mfrs. and Maple Flooring); the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice
Brandeis with Mr. Justice McKenna in American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U.S. 371, 413 (1921).
53. Rahl, supra note 9, at 146.
54. See notes 30 & 31 supra; American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States,
257 U.S. 377, 415-16 (1921) (dissenting opinion).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), provides that any individual who violates the Sherman
Act is guilty of a misdemeanor and is subject to a fine of up to $50,000 and 1 year
in jail. For a general discussion of criminal proceedings under the Sherman Act, see
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/8
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a per se rule would be too rigid and harsh and that the rights of the
public and competitors are best protected by a rule of reason analysis.
Although it is questionable which approach the Court will ultimately
adopt, the problems of exchange of price information between competitors
are so pervasive5" and perplexing that the issue will undoubtedly arise
many times in the future. It is hoped that the lower federal courts will
interpret the Container Corp. decision as applying a rule of reason and
not a per se approach.
Andrew Silverman

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

-

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -

APPLICATION

OF SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION CONFRONTATIONS.

Rivers v. United States (5th Cir. 1968)
Russell v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1969)
Recently, two federal circuit courts of appeals have reached seemingly
conflicting conclusions as to the scope of a defendant's right to counsel
at pretrial identification confrontations. In Rivers v. United States' the
defendant was convicted of attempted robbery of a mail carrier.2 After
the local sheriff arrested the defendant on information given to him by the
wounded postman, the defendant was brought to a hospital where the
victim identified him as his assailant. 3 Although counsel was not present
at this confrontation, no objection was made at trial to the victim's in-court
identification of the defendant nor to his testimony concerning the prior
out-of-court identification. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction and remanded, holding sua
sponte that the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Wade4 and
6 H.

TOULMIN,

supra note 7, at 222, 237-353 (1951).

See also Kramer, Criminal

Prosecutions For Violation Of The Sherman Act: In Search Of A Policy, 48 Gto.
L.J. 530 (1960) ; Rahl, supra note 9, at 147; Whiting, Criminal Antitrust Liability
of Corporate Representatives, 21 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 327 (1962).
56. Indicative of the pervasiveness of this problem is the fact that of the 147
consent decrees accepted between January 1, 1960 and December 31, 1966, 66 dealt
either in full or in part with agreements between competitors for the publishing of
price changes or exchanges of information relating to prices. See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE

INSTITUTE

FOR

PUBLIC

POLICY

RESEARCH,

ANTITRUST

CONSENT

DECREES

1906-1966, 97-100, 1272-1597 (1968).
1. 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968).
2. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2114 (1964).
3. The Rivers court gives no definite indication of the time which elapsed between
the assault and the subsequent confrontation,

significant. 400 F.2d at 940.
4. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

but

merely notes that the lapse was
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Gilbert v. California5 afforded defendant Rivers a constitutional right to
counsel at the pretrial confrontation. Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d
935 (5th Cir. 1968). In the second case defendant Russell was convicted
of housebreaking and petit larceny. As the defendant left the scene of
the crime, he was observed by a witness who reported the matter to the
police. Within minutes, Russell was arrested and returned to the scene,
where he was identified by the informant. Subsequently, the witness
identified the defendant at trial and the arresting officer testified to the
witness's on-the-scene identification. On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, holding that the
Wade and Gilbert decisions do not provide suspects with a constitutional
right to counsel at prompt on-the-scene confrontations. Russell v. United
States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
In 1967 the United States Supreme Court examined the constitutional
propriety of traditional police identification procedures in the Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall v. DennoO cases. In Wade, the Court specifically held
that a suspect has a sixth amendment right to counsel at a post-indictment
pretrial lineup because such a proceeding is a "critical stage"7 of the
prosecution. The Court reasoned that if counsel is present at a lineup,
he could effectively prevent unfair police practices and better protect the
accused's right to a fair trial at which the witnesses against him might
be meaningfully cross-examined." In order to enforce this sixth amendment right, the court further stated that an in-court identification made
without reference to a prior unconstitutional lineup would be inadmissible
unless the prosecution could demonstrate that the in-court identification
was not the product of the defective lineup identification but was based
on the witness's independent recollection. 9 In Gilbert, the Court strengthened the effectiveness of the proscription set forth in Wade, holding
5.388 U.S. 263 (1967).
6.388 U.S. 293 (1967).

7. Evidently, the Supreme Court defines a critical stage as "any stage of the
prosecution, formal or informal, in or out of court, where counsel's absence might
derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 226 (1967). See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) ; White v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) ; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
8. 388 U.S. at 326-27.
9. In so holding, the Court adopted the test of Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963), quoting Maguire, EVIDENCe oi? GUILT 221 (1959) :"Whether,
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection
is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." In adhering to the
Wong Sun test, the Supreme Court in Wade expressed a fear that many in-court
identifications are based on mental images formed by witnesses at lineups rather
than at the scene of the crime. Thus, at sometime during the judicial process, the
prosecution must show that these tainted mental images are not the primary basis of
the witness's ability to identify the suspect in court. Since Wade did not specify
when this burden falls on the prosecution, presumably the question may be settled at
a preliminary hearing or at a post-conviction proceeding. For authority advocating
that the question be settled at a preliminary hearing, see People v. Smiley, 54 Misc.
2d 826, 284 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Panel Discussion - The Role of the
Defense Lawyer at a Line-up in Light of the Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall Decisions,
4 CRIM. L. BULL. 273, 291-94 (1968).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/8

20

Editors: Recent Developments
SPRING

1969]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

that if counsel was not present at the lineup, no witness would be permitted to testify as to the results of the unconstitutional lineup. This
testimony is excluded per se. 10 In the Stovall case, however, the Court
announced that its decisions in Wade and Gilbert would not be applied
retroactively and that a suspect may challenge any confrontation on due
process grounds independent of his sixth amendment claims guaranteed
by Wade and Gilbert. Of the many questions left unanswered by this
now famous trilogy of cases, perhaps the most pressing is whether the
rules espoused in Wade and Gilbert are to be applied to require the
presence of counsel at all pretrial confrontations, at some pretrial confrontations, or only at post-indictment, formal lineups after counsel has
been engaged or appointed."
The expected judicial response 12 to this question was succinctly stated
by the Fifth Circuit in the Rivers case when it asserted that "[w]ith
Miranda on the books, it is indisputable that most, perhaps all, confrontations occurring after arrest will fall within the rules announced in Wade
and Gilbert. 1" This statement suggests that the Fifth Circuit, in reaching its conclusion in Rivers, focused on the policy considerations which
comprise the common denominator of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Miranda,'4 Wade, and Gilbert. In each of these cases the Court was concerned with the unreliability of evidence produced by questionable police
practices, and in each case sought to protect the accused's constitutional
rights by affording him the right to counsel at critical stages of the
prosecution.'8 Since all pretrial confrontations jeopardize the accused's
constitutional rights in much the same manner as do formal lineup
10. In Wade, the Court left unresolved the question presented when the police

allow only one of several eyewitnesses to identify the defendant at a lineup where
counsel is not present and when the identifying witness subsequently communicates
to the others that a positive identification has been made. If the witnesses who were
not present at the lineup are permitted to make their initial identification of the
suspect in court, the Wade decision can easily be circumvented.
11. The narrowest reading of the Wade and Gilbert decisions would limit the
right to counsel to the facts of those cases - to formal lineups which occur after
an indictment or information has been issued and after counsel has been either engaged
by or appointed for the suspect.
12. See Comment, The Right to Counsel During Pretrial Identification Proceedings - An Examination, 47 Nsa L. REv. 740 (1968) ; Comment, Pretrial Confrontation of Criminal Suspect By Witness To Crime, 13 S.D.L. Rev. 210 (1968);
Comment, Lawyers and Lineups, 77 YAL4 L.J. 390 (1967); 63 Nw. U.L. Riv. 251
(1968) ; 81 HARV. L. Riv. 178 (1968).
13. Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935, 939 (1968).
14. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
15. Although Wade and Gilbert would seem to be appropriate outgrowths of
Miranda, there is at least one significant difference between the former cases and
the latter. In Miranda, the Court found that counsel's presence at in-custody interrogation was necessary in order that a suspect be able to intelligently assert his
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. In Wade, the Court held, citing
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1964), that compelling a suspect to exhibit
himself in a lineup does not violate his fifth amendment rights. But see note 29 infra.
Since counsel cannot advise his client to refuse to participate in a lineup as he may,
and ordinarily does advise his client not to speak, one of counsel's main functions
at a lineup seems to be to act as a sort of policemen's policeman.
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procedures, 16 the Fifth Circuit concluded that application of Wade and
Gilbert to all pretrial confrontations is but a logical extension of those
cases.' 7 To buttress its conclusion, the Rivers court relied on convincing
and explicit language from Mr. Justice White's dissent in Wade wherein
he stated:
The rule applies to any lineup, to any other techniques employed to
produce an identification and a fortiori to a face-to-face encounter
between the witness and the suspect alone, regardless of when the
identification occurs, in time or place, and whether before or after
indictment or information.' 8
Although this language appears in a dissenting opinion, the Fifth Circuit
suggested that it properly describes the scope of application to be given
the Wade and Gilbert decisions. The court reasoned that had the Supreme
Court intended that Wade and Gilbert be confined to lineups, it would
not have concerned itself with the issue of retroactivity in the Stovall
case. The logic behind the Fifth Circuit's reasoning is difficult to impeach. The court suggested that since Stovall involved a face-to-face
confrontation with the victim, any conclusion that Wade and Gilbert were
meant to apply only to formal lineups necessarily relegates half the Stovall
decision to the status of an advisory opinion.' 9
In contrast to the approach taken by the Fifth Circuit, the District
of Columbia Circuit focused on the practical problems which ensue if the
Wade and Gilbert rules are to be applied to prompt on-the-scene confrontations. At the outset, the court referred to the compelling and
seemingly all-encompassing language of the majority opinion in Wade2 °
and also noted that the Fifth Circuit had already decided Rivers on the
16. See pp. 540-41 infra. For general discussions as to the unreliability of eyeCONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); J. FRANK &
GARDNER, THE COURT OF LAST RPSORT (1952);
Murray, The Criminal Lineup at Home and Abroad, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 610; Napley,
Problems of Effecting the Presentation of the Case for a Defendant, 66 COLUM. L.
REv. 94, 98-99 (1966) ; Comment, Constitutional Ramifications of the Police Lineup,
12 VILL. L. REv. 135 (1966).
17. The Fifth Circuit seems to approve of no exceptions to the Wade-Gilbert
rules. Citing the Court's language in Wade that the right to counsel cannot be
brushed aside because a lawyer may cause obstruction and delay, the Rivers court
suggests that emergencies will not support exceptions to the rules. 400 F.2d at 939-40.
18. 388 U.S. at 251.
19. Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1968).
20. The majority in Wade stated that:
[T]he principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases requires that we
scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine whether the
presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a
fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses
against him and to have the effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.
388 U.S. at 227.
The Court further observed:
The pretrial confrontation for the purpose of identification may take the form
of a lineup . . . or "showup" . . . or presentation of the suspect alone to the
witness, as in Stovall v. Denno. . . . It is obvious that the risks of suggestion
attend either form of confrontation and increase the dangers inhering in eyewitness identification.
Id. at 229 (emphasis added).

witness testimony, see BORCHARD,
B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957);
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strength of Mr. Justice White's dissenting opinion in Wade.21 However,
the Russell court reasoned that the Supreme Court's position in Wade
followed from its consideration of the facts of that case. The District of
Columbia Circuit pointed out, as did Mr. Justice Brennan writing for the
majority in Wade, that where counsel has already been appointed and
time is not a critical factor, there are "[n]o substantial countervailing
policy considerations ...against the requirement of the presence of counsel."'22 This language, the court concluded, leaves room for modification of
the Wade-Gilbert rules in circumstances where there are countervailing
policy considerations. Several of these countervailing policy considerations
are generally present in prompt on-the-scene confrontations. Initially, if the
police are required to return all suspects to the stationhouse and await the
convenience of counsel, lengthy delays may follow, especially where the
suspect is an indigent for whom counsel must be appointed. If the witness subsequently fails to make a positive identification, police pursuit
has been seriously hampered and an innocent party may have experienced
both unnecessary delay and the embarrassment of arrest. Secondly, although face-to-face encounters at the scene of a crime are admittedly
suggestive, they do have the advantage of presenting the suspect to the
witness when the witness's recollection is not impaired by the passage
of time. 23 In view of these considerations, the Russell court concluded
"with some hesitation," that Wade and Gilbert do not apply to prompt
24
on-the-scene confrontations.
The question which the instant cases pose when read together is,
in essence, whether the Wade-Gilbert rules should be extended to cover
all pretrial confrontations. That question is best answered by examining
the role which the attorney can play at confrontations other than lineups
and the practical problems which result if his presence is to be constitutionally required. Assuming that Wade and Gilbert apply to all pretrial
confrontations, it is initially clear that on-the-scene identifications will
fall into immediate disuse and that all suspects will have to be returned
to the stationhouse. The only alternative would seem to be to require
that attorneys accompany the police. 25 Similiarly, if counsel's presence
is constitutionally required at all such encounters, the bulk of identifications will most likely take the form of face-to-face confrontations in the
stationhouse for the simple reason that the more cumbersome lineup pro21. See p. 538 supra.

22. 388 U.S. at 237.

23. The strength of this argument is somewhat diluted by the fact that the
witness may also be suffering from wounds, shock, or other emotional stress which
may affect his mental faculties thus making him more susceptible to suggestion.
24. Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280, 1284 (1969).
25. One commentator has suggested that on-the-scene identifications might be
given special consideration under Wade in much the same manner as stop-and-frisk

under the Escobedo and Miranda decisions. 63 Nw. U.L. Rrv. 251, 257 & n.32. In
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) and in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
the Supreme Court refused to rule on the prima facie constitutionality of the stop and
frisk procedure. However, the fact that the Court ruled in favor of the police on
almost every point suggests that the Court may be re-evaluating the efficacy of
employing exclusionary rules of evidence to supervise all police activities.
Published
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cedure is by no means mandatory. 26 Of course, if the suspect has a prior
criminal record or the police can otherwise obtain photographs, a personal confrontation between witness and suspect may frequently prove
unnecessary.2 7 When a suspect is presented to the witness at a face-to-face
encounter, it is not clear exactly how counsel's presence can effectively
operate to protect the accused's sixth amendment right to confrontation.
The suspect's right to confrontation does not extend to counsel the right
to cross-examine the witness at this stage of the prosecution. 28 In addition, counsel cannot advise his client to refuse to participate since Wade
expressly stated that compelling a suspect to exhibit himself in a lineup
does not infringe on the suspect's fifth amendment rights.29 It appears
that counsel's role, then, is more that of an observer than a participant.
Admittedly, as an observer counsel can detect the identifying witness's
emotional state, any apparent prejudice or vindictiveness, and, in general,
the witnesses's ability to make a positive identification. Certainly any
overt suggestion initiated by the police, intentional or otherwise, should
be detected by alert counsel. However, the simplicity of a face-to-face
encounter minimizes counsel's ability to prevent suggestion. He can do
nothing to correct inaccuracies produced by human fallibility, and little
more to eliminate the suggestion inherent in such a confrontation. The
very fact that the suspect is in police custody may suggest to the witness
that the police believe this suspect to be the perpetrator of the crime.
This suggestion is present whether the proceeding is conducted fairly
or unfairly, and if the latter is the case, counsel can take no immediate
corrective action beyond registering his personal protest.3 0 Should the
26. The Wade and Gilbert decisions have most likely discouraged the use of the
lineup procedure. See Panel Discussion - The Role of the Defense Lawyer at a
Line-up in Light of the Wade, Gilbert and Stovall Decisions, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 273,
289 (1968).
27. In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1967), the Supreme Court
recognized that the use of photographs for the purposes of establishing identification
may be highly suggestive; however, the Court refused to apply Wade and Gilbert
and declined to regulate the admission of pretrial identification testimony based on
photographs as a matter of its supervisory authority over the federal courts. The
Court reasoned that counsel's cross-examination at trial is sufficient to protect defendant's constitutional rights as outlined in Stovall. Id. at 384.
28. The Wade and Gilbert decisions provide that the defendant's right to confrontation at trial shall be made more meaningful by counsel's attendance at pretrial
confrontations. Counsel is present to gather evidence which may later be used to
impeach identifying witnesses; however, this evidence does not include the statements
of witnesses unless they are made voluntarily. If the witnesses choose to cooperate,
counsel may question them without generating ethical problems. See ABA CANONS
oF PROFtSSIONAL ETHIcs No. 39. However, extending to counsel the constitutional
right to interrogate identifying witnesses at lineups or other pretrial confrontations
would infringe upon the states' traditional power to prepare its case without the presence of defense counsel.
29. 388 U.S. at 221-23. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Fortas dissented
in part on the fifth amendment question in Wade reasoning that to compel a suspect
to give a voice identification at a lineup is a type of forced cooperation which falls
within the historical perimeter of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 260.
Justices Black and Douglas adhered to their dissents in Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 772-79 (1966), and asserted that compulsory lineups violate the fifth amendment. 388 U.S. at 260.
30. One of the underlying assumptions of the Wade and Gilbert decisions is that
counsel's presence at a lineup, in and of itself, would have a prophylactic effect on
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/8
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police elect to present the suspect to the witness for the first time at
magistrate's court or at arraignment, counsel can do little to protect the
suspect's constitutional rights. These proceedings are equally as suggestive, if not more so than a face-to-face encounter in a stationhouse, since
the judicial environment suggests that the police are sufficiently confident
that they are willing to commence the initial stages of the prosecution.31
If counsel was in fact present when the witness identified the suspect
at any of the foregoing proceedings, the Wade and Gilbert decisions would
not exclude testimony concerning the out-of-court identification, nor would
the witness be precluded from making an in-court identification. This
testimony is admissible even though the identification may have been
made under the most suggestive circumstances; however, under Stovall,
counsel may argue to suppress this information as obtained in violation
32

of due process standards.

Although defense counsel has but a limited opportunity to suppress
testimony relating to in-court or out-of-court identifications, his presence
at the initial confrontation between the witness and the suspect does afford
him a greater capacity to effectively cross-examine the identifying witnesses at trial. Since in-court identifications are normally the highpoint of
a criminal trial, any information obtained at a pretrial confrontation which
can be used to shake the credibility of an identifying witness is invaluable
to the defense. Moreover, if the suspect was unaware of the unfairness of
the initial identification procedure,83 or chooses not to testify because of a
prior criminal record, counsel is available to testify in his behalf. Thus
when any type of face-to-face encounter is utilized by the prosecution for
the purposes of making an identification, counsel's role is no different from
that assigned to him at lineups. However, although counsel's purpose is the
same at lineups and face-to-face confrontations, his ability to be of real
service to his client by preventing suggestion is significantly curtailed
when the latter procedures are employed.
police practices. However, if the police are uncooperative and intentionally stage an
unnecessarily suggestive meeting between a witness and the suspect, counsel can hardly
compel the police to adhere to his personal standard of fairness. On the other hand,
the Court's assumption is a valid one since there is no reason to presume the police
will always be uncooperative as a general rule.
31. Perhaps the most unreliable in-court identification is that which takes place
without any pretrial confrontation. It is suggested that at trial it is little more than
a foregone conclusion that the witness will positively identify the suspect. However,
this type of evidence is most often of little evidentiary value because if a suspect's
identity is really in issue, some sort of confrontation must take place before trial.
32. Defense counsel may find it difficult to suppress identification testimony under
the standards announced in Stovall since he bears the heavy burden of establishing
that the "totality of events" surrounding the confrontation were so basically unfair
as to deny the defendant due process of law. 388 U.S. at 302.
33. For illustrations of the difficulties of a defendant recognizing and protesting
suggestive police practices, see Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1966) ;
Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965) ; Aaron v. State, 273 Ala. 337, 139
So. 2d 309 (1961) ; People v. Shields, 70 Cal. App. 2d 628, 161 P.2d 475 (1945);
People v. Hicks, 22 Ill. 2d 364, 176 N.E.2d 810 (1961) ; State v. Hill, 193 Kan. 512,
394 P.2d 106 (1964); Redmon v. Commonwealth, 321 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. Ct. App.
1959) ; Lubinski v. State, 180 Md. 1, 22 A.2d 455 (1941).
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Application of the Wade and Gilbert rules to all pretrial confrontations presents a host of practical problems especially in those situations
in which time is a critical factor. Where the victim is the only witness
to the crime, and is thought to be, or is, in imminent danger of death,
the exigencies of the situation should not be made to await the convenience of counsel; yet a literal application of Wade and Gilbert may result
in a dismissal of the charges.3 4 Additionally, prompt on-the-scene identifications may not always be a matter of convenience; yet even in circumstances where prompt identification is not an absolute necessity, the
requirement of returning all suspects to the stationhouse will serve to
provide criminals with time to escape in every case where the police
have taken the wrong man into custody. Moreover, elimination of onthe-scene confrontations removes for all practical purposes the innocent
arrestee's right to immediate exoneration. Where the police actually believe that they have the perpetrator in custody, an innocent arrestee's
on-the-scene offer to waive his right to counsel may frequently prove
unacceptable to policemen whose experience with Miranda has taught
them that "intelligent waivers" are most difficult to prove at subsequent
judicial proceedings. In addition, witnesses who were initially willing
to cooperate with the police may be reluctant to do so when informed
that identification must await the presence of counsel. Finally, the extension of Wade and Gilbert to all pretrial confrontations presents some
difficulties for counsel. If counsel attends a confrontation, he runs the risk
that his presence may add credence to the fairness of a proceeding which,
in fact, may have been less than fair, and he chances the possibility that
he may have to serve as both counsel and witness for the defense.3 5
In the light of the foregoing analysis, it would seem that the positions
taken by both circuit courts in the instant cases are not as conflicting as
may first appear. In Russell, the District of Columbia Circuit argued that
the Wade and Gilbert decisions implicitly provide for their own modification where countervailing policy considerations militate against extending the right of counsel. In Rivers, the Fifth Circuit was not faced with
significant practical considerations and thus followed the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Wade - that under the circumstances there was no valid
reason why counsel should not be required. However, although the
Russell and Rivers cases can be reconciled in this manner, the decisions
are basically different in approach. The Fifth Circuit's reasoning is legalistic and conceptual, thereby indicating an inclination to give sweeping
application to the Wade-Gilbert rules. In contrast, the pragmatic over34. Since there can be no in-court identification if the witness dies, and since
Gilbert disqualifies anyone present at an unconstitutional confrontation from testifying
as to its results, the prosecution is foreclosed on the issue of identity.
35. The American Bar Association has traditionally discouraged attorneys from
participating as witnesses in cases where they represent one of the parties. ABA
CANONS or PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 19. Counsel's testimony may create many
difficulties not the least of which includes testifying against his client's interest by
failing to reconstruct the events of the confrontation so as to articulate the existence
of any unfairness.
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tones of the Russell decision indicate that the District of Columbia Circuit
is generally disposed to limit Wade and Gilbert in response to the mounting
problems of criminal administration. In the absence of case law clarifying
the reach of the broad language of Wade and Gilbert, it is suggested that
many state and lower federal courts may be inclined to distinguish Wade
6
and Gilbert in much the same manner as did the Russell court.A
In conclusion, it is suggested that the Wade and Gilbert decisions
should not be confined to post-indictment formal lineups. In the first
instance, a pretrial confrontation is a critical stage of the prosecution
whether it occurs before or after an indictment or information.3 Secondly, confining Wade and Gilbert to their facts renders them meaningless, since they might be easily circumvented by discontinuing lineups
in favor of the more convenient face-to-face confrontations. In the absence
of the corrective legislation which the Supreme Court invited in Wade, 8
it is suggested that Wade and Gilbert should be extended as a general
rule to all pretrial confrontations. However, in the extraordinary case
where the exigencies of the situation cannot await the presence of counsel - for example, where the sole witness to the crime is thought to be
or is in imminent danger of death - Wade and Gilbert should not be
applied provided the prosecution can show by clear and convincing evidence that prompt identification was necessary under the circumstances
because no other reasonable alternatives were available. In such a case
this additional burden of proof would significantly strenghten defendant's
due process rights as defined in Stovall, yet would avoid the complete
failure of prosecution which may result from the application of Wade and
Gilbert.
Perhaps a better solution to the thorny problems left unresolved by
the Wade and Gilbert decisions might be formulated if the underlying
issue were not framed as whether counsel should be present at face-to-face
confrontations, but rather whether such confrontations are constitutionally permissible at all. If it were found that face-to-face confrontations
are so inherently suggestive as to produce basically unreliable evidence,
all initial pretrial identifications would require a lineup since that would
39
be the only procedure which would afford a suspect due process of law.
36. United States v. Davis, 399 F.2d 948 (1968) ; Commonwealth v. Bumpus, 68
Mass. 936, 238 N.E.2d 343 (1968).
37. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964), where Mr. Justice
Goldberg stated that "[jilt would exalt form over substance to make the right of
counsel . . . depend on whether at the time of the interrogation, the authorities had
secured a formal indictment."
38. The Court, after determining that lineups were a critical stage of the prosecution, indicated that legislation or even remedial police regulations might make lineups
sufficiently equitable so as to remove the basis for regarding them as critical stages.
388 U.S. at 239. A similar invitation was made in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444 (1966).
39. In Stovall, the Court concluded that a face-to-face confrontation may be so
suggestive in certain circumstances as to deny defendant due process of law. 388 U.S.
at 302. See also the recent Supreme Court ruling of Foster v. California, 37 U.S.L.W.
4281 (Apr. 1, 1969). A finding that face-to-face confrontations are inherently
suggestive would be tantamount to an admission that the nature of this confrontation
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The practical burdens of this mandatory lineup procedure could be considerably mitigated if the use of substitute counsel were approved.4 0 In
the ordinary case, this compromise would provide maximum protection
to the defendant's rights while imposing minimum burdens on all parties
concerned, and in the extraordinary case an exception could be formulated.
John A. Roney

CORPORATE TAXATION - ACCUMULATED EARNINGS - SECTION
531 ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX Is LEVIED IF ANY PURPOSE FOR
THE ACCUMULATION Is TAX AVOIDANCE.

United States v. Donruss Co. (U.S. 1969)
Through profitable operation, the respondent, a Tennessee corporation, substantially increased its undistributed earnings during the tax
years 1955 through 1961. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, pursuant to section 531 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, assessed accumulated earnings taxes against respondent for the years 1960 and 1961.1
Respondent paid the tax and brought a refund suit in the District Court
for the Western District of Tennessee. The trial judge instructed the
jury that in order to find the Donruss Co. liable for the assessed tax,
tax avoidance had to be "the purpose" of the accumulations. The jury
returned a verdict for the respondent and the government appealed. The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, 2 holding that the jury
might have been led to believe that tax avoidance must be the "sole"
purpose for accumulating and that the correct test of purpose is whether
avoidance of tax was the "dominant, controlling or impelling" motive
for accumulation. The Supreme Court, resolving a conflict among the
method would preclude effective cross-examination in every case, thus denying defendants their due process right to a fair trial. Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1964).
40. The Wade Court left open "the question of whether the presence of substitute
counsel might not suffice where the notification and presence of the suspect's own
counsel would result in prejudicial delay." 388 U.S. at 237. For difficulties inherent
in the use of substitute counsel, see Comment, The Right To Counsel During Pretrial
Identification Proceedings - An Examination, 47 Nga. L. Riv. 740, 754-55 (1968).
1. Briefly, the statutory system operates as follows: Section 531 establishes the
tax and specifies the rates; Section 532 defines corporations to which the tax shall
apply and states the violation for which the tax is imposed; Section 533(a), the
evidentiary section, provides that if the Commissioner can show that an accumulation
was unreasonable, that showing gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the
accumulation was motivated by the forbidden purpose; Section 534 allows the taxpayer, in certain instances, to shift to the Commissioner the burden of proving accumulation beyond the reasonable needs of the business; Section 535 provides for a credit
for that portion of earnings retained for the reasonable needs of the business; finally,
section 537 provides that the reasonable needs of the business shall include "reasonably
anticipated needs."
2. Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1967).
3. Id. at 297-98.
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circuits, reversed the court of appeals, holding that in order to rebut
the presumption created by an unreasonable accumulation the taxpayer
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that avoidance of income
tax with respect to shareholders was not one of the reasons for the accumulation. United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297 (1969).
The accumulated earnings tax is an attempt by Congress to deter use
of the corporate veil to avoid income taxes. 4 The tax compels the company to distribute any profits not needed for the conduct of its business
so that individual stockholders will become liable for taxes on the dividends received. 5 The tax originated in the Tariff Act of 19136 and has
been revised several times due to the recurrent ineffectiveness of the
provisions. 7 The current tax is imposed when two conditions have been
met: (1) where there has been an unreasonable accumulation of profits
by a corporation, and (2) the accumulation by the corporation has been
for the purpose of avoiding income tax.8
In Donruss, the Supreme Court was confronted with the sole question of what showing of a tax-avoidance purpose is necessary to impose
the accumulated earnings tax.) Prior to the instant decision the circuit
courts of appeal had so differently interpreted sections 532 and 533(a),
the statutory basis for the purpose test, that no less than three tests as
to the showing of "purpose" were utilized. The court of appeals in the
Donruss case had adopted the First Circuit's position' ° and the position
urged by the respondent that the tax should only apply when avoidance
4. United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 293, 303 (1969).

See Comment,

Accumulated Earnings Tax: Burdens of Proof of Reasonableness and Purpose, 54
CALIP. L. R v. 1050 (1966) ; Note, The Accumulated Earnings Tax, 76 YALE L.J.
793 (1966).
5. Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U.S. 693, 699 (1943) ; Bolan,
Section 102: A Persistant Menace to Closely-Held Corporations, 27 ST. JOHN'S L.
Rpv. 1, 2 (1952).
6. Ch. 16, § II, G(a), 38 Stat. 172.
7. The original provisions imposed a tax on shareholders of a corporation
formed or "fraudulently" availed of for the purpose of preventing imposition of the
tax. Due to difficulties in proving "fraudulently," the word was deleted in the Revenue

Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 220, 40 Stat. 1057. Attempts were made to strengthen the tax
during the 1920's and 1930's, but the statute remained the same until 1934. See JOINT
COMMIrTTE ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, The Taxation of Corporate Surplus Accumulations, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 200-05 (1952). In 1934 Congress dealt with a flagrant

example of that ineffectiveness, the personal holding company, by subjecting it to a
general accumulated earnings tax. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 102(a), 48 Stat.
702 (now INT. RgV. CODE of 1954, § 532). However, the problem of ineffectiveness
continued to be acute until 1938 when Congress imposed a rebuttable presumption of
tax avoidance on those corporations proven to have accumulated unreasonably.
Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 102(b), 52 Stat. 483 (now INT. Rev. CODE of 1954,
§ 533(a)). This presumption was left virtually unchanged by the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.
8. See B. BITTKER & J. EuSTics, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OP CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS § 6.08 (2d ed. 1966), for an informative discussion of the operation of the tax.
9. The Court explicitly stated that they would not consider the issue of the
standards governing the reasonableness of corporate accumulations. 393 U.S. at 301.
10. Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488 (lst Cir. 1960). See also
Appollo Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 867 (1st Cir. 1966). The Sixth Circuit
has adhered to this view in Shaw-Walker Co. v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 205 (6th
Cir. 1968).
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of income tax is the dominant motive behind the accumulation. The
Second" and Fifth 12 Circuits had specifically rejected this view and, while
their position is unclear, it appears that they had adopted the test urged
by the government in the instant case - that the tax should be imposed
if one of the purposes for the accumulation is tax avoidance. On the
other hand, the Eighth' 3 and Tenth 14 Circuits took what appears to be
an intermediate position, holding that the imposition of the tax is proper
if tax avoidance is one of the determining purposes of the accumulation.
In their arguments both the respondent and the government relied
on the language of the statute to support their respective positions. Section 532 defines corporations to which the tax is to apply as those which
5
are "formed or availed of for the purpose"' of avoiding income taxes,
while section 533 (a), the evidentiary section, provides that an unreasonable
accumulation shall be "determinative of the purpose to avoid the income
tax"' 6 unless rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.
Respondent Donruss supported its position by arguing that if Congress had intended to utilize the government's "one of the purposes" test
it would have used the article "a" in sections 532 and 533(a). T The
argument continues that by using the article "the" in the operative part
of the statute, Congress indicated its intent that tax avoidance be at
least the dominant motive for the accumulation. Respondent also contended that the legislative history supported its position with respect to
language of the sections' s in that the old evidentiary section, section 102
of the Revenue Act of 1938, used the words "a purpose," while the
present evidentiary section, section 533(a), contains the words "the pur9
pose," thus showing a change in congressional intent.' Also supporting
this argument are the committee reports which reveal that Congress intended to strengthen the tax in 1938,20 whereas in 1954 it was the con11. Trico Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 799 (1943), was decided under the Internal Revenue Code of 1938; however,
the position was substantiated under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in United
States v. Duke Laboratories, Inc., 337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964).
12. Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 817 (1962).
13. Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v.Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958).
14. World Publishing Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948). See
also Henry Van Hummell, Inc. v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1966).
15. INT. RSv. CODE of 1954, § 532.
16. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 533 (a).
17. In support of this argument the respondent relied upon Young Motor Co.
v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1960). The Court not only rejected this
argument, but also concluded that the cases in the estate and gift tax area, cited by
respondent, were inapposite in both theory and legislative history. United States v.
Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 293, 308-09 (1969).
18. Brief for Respondent at 21-24, United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S.
297 (1969).
19. Until 1938, the predecessor of the presumption in section 533(a) made an
unreasonable accumulation "prima facie evidence of a purpose to avoid surtax upon
shareholders." Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 104(6), 47 Stat. 195 (now INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 533(b) (emphasis added).
that was
20. The report of the Senate Finance Committee accompanying the bill
to become the Revenue Act of 1938 provided: "The proposal is to strengthen [the
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gressional desire to "minimize the threat to corporations accumulating
22
21 In addition, this change
funds for legitimate business purposes ....
was evidenced by the fact that while Congress expected a substantial increase in revenue by passage of section 102 of the 1938 Act, 23 the changes
in the Revenue Act of 1954 were expected to decrease revenue by
$10,000,000.24
In refuting these arguments, the government first explained that
when Congress dealt with the similar problem of defining the degree of
purpose necessary to impose a tax in other sections of the Code, they
used terms such as "principal purpose"2 5 and "used principally"2 6 where
they intended that the purpose be a dominant one. Therefore, the negative inference of not using similar words in sections 532 and 533(a) is
that Congress did not intend the requisite purpose to be dominant. The
government also explained 27 that the change in language from "a" to
"the" was merely one of phraseology since there is no specific mention
of a change in wording in the legislative history, whereas other specific
changes in the 1954 Code 28 were discussed at length in the committee
reports.
After addressing itself to these arguments, the Donruss Court found
neither position to be conclusive, noting that the phrase "availed of for
the purpose" was inherently vague and that the change in the evidentiary
section was merely one of phraseology. Rather, the Court looked to the
55-year legislative history of the statute in order to ascertain the legislative intent. 29 It noted that from its inception in 1913 the government
found difficulty in applying the tax, which resulted in several changes
evidentiary] section by requiring the taxpayer by a clear preponderance of the evidence
to prove the absence of any purpose .... " S. IRP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 5
(1938) (emphasis added).
21. S. RtP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1954) ; accord, H.R. RzP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1954).
22. This argument is also supported by the fact that the Revenue Act of 1938
required a "clear preponderance" of the evidence, whereas the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 deleted the word "clear" and now requires merely a preponderance of
the evidence.
23. Congress did not expect an overall change in revenue by passage of the
Revenue Act of 1938. S. RZP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938). However,
they did expect a substantial increase in revenue from passage of section 102 of that
Act. S. Rep. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1938).
24. S. lUP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1954).
25. INT. Rtv. CODe of 1954, §§ 269(a) (2), 357(b) (1).
26. INT. Rtv. CODZ of 1954, § 355(a) (1) (B).
27. Brief for Petitioner at 16-17, United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297
(1969).
28. Other than the change in the preponderance of evidence discussed in note 23
supra, the following changes were made in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954: section
534 now allows the taxpayer to shift the burden of proof of reasonableness to the
Commissioner; section 535 allows for a credit for that portion of the accumulated
earnings that is reasonable; and section 537 broadens the definition of reasonable.
See Canty, The Accumulated Earnings Tax 1954 Reforms: An Appraisal, 2 U. SAN
FRANcIsco L. Rtv. 242 (1968). See also Shockley, Sweeney & Brady, TAXATION
AND BUSINESS PLANNING

(1963) ; Barker, Penalty Tax on Corporations Improperly

Accumulating Surplus, 35 TAxeS 949 (1957).
29. 393 U.S. at 301-02.
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designed to bolster its effectiveness.8 0 However, in writing the majority
opinion, Mr. Justice Marshall explained 3' that the problem continued to
be acute until 193832 when Congress enacted the forerunner of the present evidentiary section. This statute, 33 which imposed a rebuttable presumption of tax avoidance purpose once an unreasonable accumulation
was found, continued in effect until 1954. However, during the intervening 16 years several complaints were made by taxpayers who insisted
the tax unfairly favored the government in its application.3 4 Therefore, Congress, realizing the inherent inequities facing the taxpayer, made
several changes in the 1954 statute3 affecting the burden of proof on the
issue of reasonableness. These changes were generally favorable to the
taxpayer and had the overall effect of shifting the emphasis from a subjective question of intent 36 to a more objective standard of the reasonableness of the accumulation. The Donruss Court concluded, however,
that none of the 1954 changes affected the required degree of tax avoidance
purpose. The Court stated that adoption of the respondent's test, dominant
motive, would go a long way toward destroying that presumption, for as
the Court said:
As Judge Learned Hand said of the much weaker presumption contained in the Revenue Act of 1921 . . . "[a]

statute which stands on

the footing of the participants' state of mind may need the support
of a presumption, indeed be practically unenforceable without it ....

.

United Business Corp. v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 754, 755 (C.A. 2d
Cir. 1933). And, "[t]he utility of . . . [that] presumption . . . is
well neigh destroyed if . . . [it] is saddled with requirement of proof

of 'the primary or dominant purpose' of the accumulation." Barrow
Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79, 82 (C.A. 5th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1962).37
Given the language of the statute and the legislative history, the Court
then concluded that the government's proposed instruction was correct and
that the tax should be levied if one of the purposes for the unreasonable
accumulation of profits by a corporation was the avoidance of tax on the
shareholders.
30. See note 8 supra.
31. 393 U.S. at 305.
32. These difficulties were highlighted by two decisions in which the taxpayer
avoided the tax by a minimal showing of non-tax purpose. National Grocery Co. v.
Helvering, 92 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1937) ; Commissioner v. Cecil B. DeMille Productions,
Inc., 90 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1937).
33. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 102(c), 52 Stat. 483 (now IN'. Rtv. CODE
of 1954, § 533(a)).
34. See, e.g., Bolan, Section 102: A Persistent Menace to Closely Held Corporations, 27 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1 (1952) ; Comment, Accumulated Earnings Tax:
Burdens of Proof of Reasonablenessand Purpose, 54 CALIF. L. Riv. 1050, 1051 (1966).
35. See note 28 supra.
36. Several courts have considered intent to be the ultimate question in imposition
of the tax. See Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.
1958) ; Whitney Chain & Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1945);
United States v. Tway Coal Sales Co., 75 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1935).
37. 393 U.S. at 308.
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The Court's lack of clarity as to the scope of purpose may raise
several problems. While the majority indicated that "purpose" will mean8
more than mere knowledge, which is undoubtedly present in every case,3
it was not made clear whether this explication should be included in an
instruction to the jury. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the dissent, suggested that unless the jury instructions include the exegesis that purpose
will mean more than mere knowledge, the taxpayer may be unable to rebut
the section 533 (a) presumption. 9 He explained that in everyday speech
we commonly say that a person has a purpose to do something when he
acts with knowledge that the thing inevitably will result. 40 Since in nearly
every case the jury will be aware that the corporation had knowledge of
the possible tax savings,41 if they equate this knowledge with a purpose
to avoid the tax, the tax will be imposed in every case where an unreasonable accumulation has been proved. Although Congress did not
make clear what the proper test of purpose should be, they in no way
suggest, as Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out,42 that the taxpayer should be
precluded from a "last clear chance" to rebut the statute. Indeed, if the
"any purpose" test denies the taxpayer the opportunity of rebuttal, the
effect of the instant decision would be to eliminate the evidentiary section
from the statute.
Although the dissent agreed with the majority that the respondent's
contention would negate the effect of the presumption, 4 they also felt
that a test less weighted against the taxpayer than that adopted by the
majority would be more in harmony with congressional intent. Mr. Justice
Harlan, using what he called the "common sense approach," explained
that the real task of the Court was to frame an instruction which would
readily be understood by a jury, and from which the jury would reach
results more in accord with the underlying congressional intent. The dissent therefore suggested a "but for" rule by which the jury would be
instructed "to impose the tax if it finds that the taxpayer would not have
accumulated earnings but for its knowledge that a tax saving would result."' 44 Under this test, the government would succeed if it could show,

with the aid of the section 533(a) presumption, that without the spur of
tax avoidance the taxpayer would not have accumulated earnings. As was
38. Id. at 309.
39. Id. at 310-12.
40. In construing sections 532 and 533(a) many courts have used the words
"purpose" and "intention" interchangeably. See, e.g., Henry Van Hummel, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 364 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1966) ; Youngs Rubber Corp. v. Commissioner,
331 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1964); Harry A. Koch Co. v. Vinal, 228 F. Supp. 782 (D.
Neb. 1964).
41. The majority concedes that knowledge of the tax saving will be present in
nearly every case. 393 U.S. at 309.

42. Id. at 310.

43. Both majority and dissent felt that respondent's test was improper because:
(1) the tax could be avoided if at least one other motive was equal to tax avoidance;
(2) the tax will depend on interested corporate testimony; and (3) respondent's test
would result in non-imposition of the tax in situations in which Congress meant there

to be liability.

44. 393 U.S. at 313.
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pointed out by Mr. Justice Harlan, the "but for" test would permit the
taxpayer to escape the tax by offering him an effective method of rebutting
the presumption created by the statute.
It may be argued, however, that results under the "but for" test
would be too favorable to the taxpayer, for as difficult as it may be for
the taxpayer to prove absence of "any purpose", it may be just as difficult
for the government to show that the taxpayer would not have accumulated
"but for" the tax saving. Moreover, the dissent's approach may be criticized for its emphasis on the subjective question of intent, whereas the
1954 changes in the Code were specifically designed to give the objective
45
question of reasonableness the greater weight.
Since it would be most difficult to prove that a publicly owned corporation was availed of for the proscribed purpose, especially if management is independent and not under the dominion of a few large stock4
holders, 40 nearly all section 531 cases involve closely-held corporations. 1
When these facts are considered in light of the majority's test, it could
be said that the "any purpose" test imposes an additional presumption
against the taxpayer, for by its very nature a closely-held corporation
is availed of for tax advantages. 48 If Congress' intent was to balance
this advantage by imposing a "general tax" - a tax without regard to
purpose - on all closely-held corporations that accumulate earnings, the
majority's test would seem to fulfill this purpose. In 1938, however, when
the House Ways and Means Committee suggested such an approach as
a means of resolving the ineffectiveness of the tax,49 the Senate Finance
Committee labeled the proposal as "drastic", 50 and instead recommended
use of a rebuttable presumption. This recommendation was later
adopted. 51 The accumulated earnings tax by its very definition is not a
general tax, but a "penalty tax" that taxes a proscribed motive, and the
fact tax savings are a necessary result of an accumulation should not be
a consideration in imposition of the tax. To this extent, the test posed
by the respondent, the dominant purpose test, can more readily be seen
strictly as a penalty tax, for under the majority's test the taxpayer is
penalized not only for having availed of a corporation for the proscribed
45. Id. at 306-07.
46. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1954). Although in Trico
Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 799
(1943), there were 2200 shareholders, 75 percent of the stock was owned by a
small group.
47. B. BITTKER &J. EusTICE, supra note 9, at 213. Another explanation is that in
a publicly owned corporation there is the added pressure of stockholder derivative
suits, a pressure that may be a greater incentive to declare dividends than section 531
itself. See Note, Derivative Actions Arising From Payment of Penalty Taxes Under
Section 102, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 394 (1949).
48. Brief for Respondent at 16-18, United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297
(1969). Undoubtedly, in organizing a closely held corporation, the owners or managers
recognize that tax benefits may necessarily flow therefrom, especially in those situations where the individuals' bracket is greater than that of the corporation.
49. H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
50. S. RiP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1938).
51. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 102(b), 52 Stat. 483 (now INT. REv. CO0nE

of 1954, § 533(b)).
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purpose, but also for having had knowledge of the consequences of the
accumulation. If knowledge will lead to imposition of the tax, it would
appear that the taxpayer will be discouraged from understanding the
2
tax law, a result which clearly seems contrary to the congressional intent.r
The "dominant purpose" test is therefore the better rule, for once a taxpayer understands the system it seems only reasonable that tax-minimization will play some role in his thinking. 53 In light of the overall legislative history of the accumulated earnings tax, the "dominant purpose"
test strikes a sound balance between the counterveiling policies of preventing use of the corporate veil to avoid the tax and minimizing the
fears of those corporations that accumulate earnings for legitimate business purposes.
The most significant ramification of the Donruss decision is that
the purpose test has been effectively eliminated and that the taxpayer
will now have to defend a section 531 case almost entirely on the issue
of the reasonableness of the accumulation. On this point, the Court
has bolstered the progressive congressional intent of relying more heavily
upon a completely objective criterion. However, once the jury concludes
that an accumulation was unreasonable, contrary to the clear congressional
intent expressed in section 533(a), the tax in practically all cases will be
imposed - for under the "any purpose" test the rebuttable presumption
may be so difficult to rebut that it will be in effect conclusive.
In those few cases where the taxpayer may be able to rebut the presumption, he will be compelled to do so with very explicit plans. In litigating cases, since the evidence offered on the question of unreasonableness of the accumulation will also be offered on the subjective question
of purpose, it will be advantageous, and almost a necessity, for the taxpayer to keep specific plans to use as proof of a non-tax saving purpose.
For example, if an earnings build-up is undertaken to finance future plant
expansion, specific plans should be drawn up and reflected in the company's minutes. Also, the progress or anticipated progress of the plan
should be recorded, particularly in minutes of meetings which pass on a
dividend policy. By these measures, the presumption of tax avoidance
purpose will have been rebutted by factors other than interested nondocumented corporate testimony.
In final analysis, although the Supreme Court has resolved the conflict among the circuits by adopting the "any purpose" test, the plain
language of the statute provides the taxpayer an escape from the tax if
the unreasonable accumulation was for other than tax avoidance motives.
It is suggested that a practical result of Donruss will be the elimination
52. Under this analysis it would be advantageous for a taxpayer to prove he was
completely ignorant of the tax laws, thereby preventing the government from proving
he had "knowledge" of the tax advantages gained by accumulating earnings. The First
Circuit has taken a similar position that if knowledge leads to imposition of the tax
only those stockholders showing substantial net losses could avoid the surtax. Young
Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488, 491 (lst Cir. 1960).
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of that clause from the statute. Although Judge Learned Hand felt that
the utility of a rebuttable presumption would be destroyed by saddling
it with the requirement of proof of primary or dominant purpose, conversely, bolstering a presumption by proof of "any purpose" may have
the opposite effect of making that presumption conclusive. The "dominant
purpose" test, considered in light of the emphasis on the reasonable use
of funds expressed in the 1954 Code, appears to be the better rule. It
strikes a balance between the conflicting policies expressed by Congress
and penalizes those who intentionally abuse the corporate form. It also
clarifies the degree of purpose needed to impose the tax and eliminates
the possibility of imposing a general tax regardless of motive. It is
therefore suggested that Congress amend sections 532 and 533(a) by
adding the word "dominant."
Robert M. Britton

LABOR LAW

-

SOLICITATION AND DISTRIBUTION -

COLLECTIVE BAR-

GAINING PROVISO PROHIBITING EMPLOYEE SOLICITATION AND DISTRIBUTION ON COMPANY PREMISES DURING NON-WORKING TIME
AND IN NON-WORKING AREAS CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF SECTION

8(a) (1).
NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Prods., Inc. (5th Cir. 1968)
Plaintiff employee, who was discharged at the request of the union
for soliciting on behalf of a rival union during non-working hours but
on company premises, brought charges against respondents Mid-States
Metal Products, Inc. and International Chemical Workers Union alleging,
inter alia, that the employer violated section 8(a) (1) of the National
Labor Relations Act by enforcing a contract provision which prohibited
solicitation during non-working hours and distribution in non-work areas. 1
1. The employee alleged that the employer violated sections 8(a) (1), (2), and
(3), which provide in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation
zation ...

. . .

of any labor organi-

(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization ....

29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1)-(3) (1964).
The employee also claimed that the respondent union had engaged in conduct
which violated sections 8(b) (1) and (2) of the Act which state in essence that
it is unfair labor practice for a union "to restrain or coerce . . . employees in
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/8
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157" of the Act or "to cause
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The National Labor Relations Board, after reviewing the trial examiner's
findings, ordered the immediate reinstatement of the discharged employee
and issued a cease and desist order which included an interdiction against
Mid-States from promulgating and enforcing those particular contract
provisions. 2 Pursuant to section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations
Act, the Board petitioned for enforcement of its order to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which affirmed the Board's
order holding, inter alia, that the promulgation and enforcement of nosolicitation and no-distribution rules contained in the collective bargaining agreement violated section 8(a) (1) to the extent that the rules prohibit employees from solicitation on the employer's premises during nonworking time and from distribution in non-working areas. NLRB v. MidStates Metal Prods., Inc., 403 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1968).
4
In Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB3 and NLRB v. Le Tourneau,

the two landmark cases in the solicitation and distribution area, the
Supreme Court held that an employer presumptively violates section
8(a) (1) when he unilaterally imposes no-solicitation and no-distribution
rules against employees during non-working time. 5 The validity of nosolicitation and no-distribution provisions in a collective bargaining agreement, however, has yet to be decided by the Supreme Court, although the
or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee" in regards

to membership in any labor organization. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b) (1)-(2) (1964).
The Board found the allegations to be true and the Court of Appeals affirmed,
deciding that the respondent union violated section 8(b) (2) by attempting to cause
and by causing the employer to discharge the employee due to his anti-union activity
and also that the employer violated section 8(a) (2) and (3) by discharging the
employee at the union's request because he had engaged in activities against the union.
The union, because of threats of physical violence and discharge made by it to the
employee, was also found to have violated section 8(b) (1).
2. Mid-States Metal Products, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 872 (1966).
3. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
4. Id. For discussion of these cases, see Daykin Employees' Right To Organize
on Company Time and Company Property, 42 ILL. L. Rev. 301, 323 (1947) ; Getman,
Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort To Insulate Free Employee Choice,
32 U. Cm. L. Rev. 735 (1965) ; Vanderheyden, Employee Solicitation and Distribution - A Second Look, 14 LAB. L.J. 781 (1963) ; 28 B.U.L. Rev. 501 (1948)
37 CALIF. L. Rev. 144 (1949); 64 COLUM. L. Rev. 780 (1964).
5. The Board, in Stoddard Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962), refined
the distribution rule and distinguished it from solicitation. In enunciating the "area"
tests, the Board held that while a rule forbidding distribution of union literature by
employees in working areas will be presumptively valid even though it applies to both
working and non-working time, a rule forbidding distribution in non-working areas
during non-working time will be presumptively invalid. The Board's position has been
unanimously endorsed by the courts of appeals. E.g., NLRB v. Challenge-Cook
Bros., 374 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Whitfield Pickle Co., 374 F.2d 576
(5th Cir. 1967) ; NLRB v. Ertel Mfg. Corp., 352 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1965) ; NLRB
v. Miller, 341 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1965). For a brief discussion of Stoddard, see
Pokempner, Employer Free Speech Under The National Labor Relations Act, 25
MD. L. REv. 111, 123-25 (1965) ; Vanderheyden, Employee Solicitation and Distribution - A Second Look, 14 LAB. L.J. 781 (1963).
The distinction drawn between no-solicitation and no-distribution rules is
based on the sound policy considerations that an employer should be allowed to
prohibit solicitation during working time to prevent interference with efficient plant
production and discipline, but that during non-working hours only special circumstances which indicate actual or potential interference with plant production should
bar employees from soliciting. E.g., NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128
(2d Cir. 1963) ; NLRB v. Linda Joe Shoe Co., 307 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1962).
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acceptability of such a provision has been before the Board and the courts
of appeals. The Board has consistently taken the position that a nosolicitation and no-distribution contract provision is invalid to the extent
that it prohibits solicitation and distribution on the employer's premises
in non-working areas and during non-working hours. 6 While this position has been upheld by the District of Columbia Circuit, 7 both the
Sixth8 and Seventh9 Circuits have rejected it and refused to enforce the
Board's order.
Both the Mid-States court and the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
would agree that the employee's right to solicit and distribute literature
on behalf of a rival union during non-working hours is a fundamental
section 7 organizational right which cannot be totally bargained away.
However, the major thrust of their disagreement appears to be whether
the employee has the right to exercise this protected activity on the
employer's premises.
In Mid-States, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals approached this
issue in the context of the inherent conflict between the union's right
to exclusively represent its members 10 and the right of the individual
employees not to be deprived of rights guaranteed to them by section 7.11
The court summarily rejected the polar positions that all or none of the
6. General Motors Corp., 158 N.L.R.B. 1723 (1966); Armco Steel Corp., 148
N.L.R.B. 1179 (1964) ; General Motors Corp., 147 N.L.R.B. 509 (1964).
Earlier Board cases reached a different result: Clinton Foods, Inc., 112
N.L.R.B. 239 (1955); Fruitvale Canning Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 884 (1950); May Dep't
Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944), modified, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946). In the
latter case the Board noted that these contract provisions were "the results of the
mutual accommodation involved in collective bargaining over the terms and conditions

of employment of the employees covered by them" and that "the employees embraced
by these contracts . . . have thereby effectively bargained away their right to engage
in union solicitation on the respondent's premises." Id. at 981 n.17.
The Board's current position may be aptly summarized by the following
language:
It is well recognized that a salutary purpose may be achieved by refusing to
disturb concessions yielded by either party through the processes of collective
bargaining even where such a concession may infringe upon rights guaranteed
employees under Section 7 of the Act. . . . The validity of a contractual waiver
of employee rights must depend, however, upon whether the interference with
the employees' statutory rights is so great as to override any legitimate reasons
for upholding the waiver.
Gale Prods., 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 1247 (1963).
7. Steelworkers v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
8. General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 345 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1965) ; Armco Steel
Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1965).
9. NLRB v. Gale Prods., 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964).
10.
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment . ...
29 U.S.C. § 15 9(a) (1964).
11. Section 7 provides in part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities . . ..
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
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section 7 rights could be waived by the union, 12 and instead adopted the
3
position that fundamental section 7 rights could not be bargained away.'
In order to determine which section 7 rights are fundamental the court
utilized a test which delineates between waiver of the rights of individual
employees, such as designating and constantly reevaluating their bargaining agent, and the right of employees acting in concert to achieve economic goals. 14 In applying this test to the specific section 7 right involved
in the instant case, the court concluded that the right to solicit on the
employer's premises during non-working time was too essential to the
fundamental right of organizing through solicitation and distribution to
be bargained away.
By prohibiting the waiver of on-the-premises solicitation, the court
explicitly rejected the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Gale
Prods.15 and the decisions following it,16 where on facts essentially similar
to Mid-States, the court refused to enforce the Board's order which invalidated similar no-solicitation and no-distribution contract provisions. 7
The Gale court based its decision on the premise that by upholding the
validity of these contract provisions employees were not being deprived
of fundamental section 7 rights because, while admittedly the most effective means of exercising these rights were taken away, alternative means
12. 403 F.2d at 704-05. The court reasoned that to contend that no section 7
rights could be waived by the union would ignore the "exclusive representative"
principle underlying section 9(a) which requires the employer to bargain only with a
particular labor organization as the certified representative of the employees. On the
other hand, to say that these rights could never be waived would do violence to the
policy behind the Act of encouraging the practice of collective bargaining. Id.
13. Id. at 706. For a general discussion of the rights of the individual employee
and collective bargaining agreements, see Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining And
The Concept of Contract, 48 COLUM. L. Riv. 829 (1948); Cox, Rights Under A
Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. Rizv. 601 (1956) ; Hanslowe, The Collective Agreement and the Duty of Fair Representation, 14 LAa. L.J. 1052 (1963) ; Summers,
Individual Rights In Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 362
(1962); Summers, Individual Rights In Collective Agreements: A Preliminary
Analysis, 9 BUVFALO L. Rtv. 239 (1959) ; Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 112 U. PA. L. Rrv. 467 (1964) ; Comment, Federal
Protection of Individual Rights Under Labor Contracts, 73 YALt L.J. 1215 (1964).
14. 403 F.2d at 705. The court reasoned that when dealing with contract waivers
of various economic weapons such as the right to strike, the court will allow such
waivers noting that the employees are acting in concert through their representative
to achieve bargained-for concessions. For examples of cases where economic levers
were waived, see Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (no-strike
clause) ; NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953) (union-security
clause); Napier v. System Federation No. 91, 127 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Ky. 1955)
(seniority rights).
15. 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964). For commentary on this case, see 53 ILL. B.J.
629 (1965) ; 44 NB. L. Rxv. 645 (1965).
16. See note 8 supra.
17. The text of the provisions in dispute were as follows:
There shall be no other general distribution or posting by employees of
pamphlets, advertising or political matter, notices, or any kind of literature upon
Company property, other than as herein provided.
No employee is authorized or will be permitted to solicit membership for
Insurance Companies, Fraternal, Social or other organizations, or to carry on within the Plant any outside business involving patronage on the part of the Employees.
337by
F.2d
at 391.University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1969
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were available."' In support of this conclusion the court emphasized that
this waiver was a result of collective bargaining, which it felt clearly
distinguished it from Republic Aviation,19 and that collective bargaining
20
provisions are not to be measured by their desirability to the employee.
The court further justified its conclusion by advancing the policy consideration that the no-solicitation clause was "conducive to the stabilization of labor relations during the contract period and thus in harmony
21
with a prime objective of the Act."

While it is clear that one of the policies of the Act is to foster stable
labor-management relations, upon analysis of the competing positions it
will be seen that the Mid-States conclusion appears more in harmony with
the overall purposes of the Act.2 2 As previously pointed out, neither
Mid-States nor Gale dispute the position that the National Labor Relations Act gives the employee the fundamental right to organize, select,
or change their bargaining agents for the purposes of fostering collective
bargaining.23 It is evident that if the right to organize is fundamental
and therefore is to exist, the individual employee must be able to meaningfully exercise that right. The Gale court merely stated that alternative
means of solicitation were available to the employees in their effort to
change their bargaining representative, but failed to make any evaluation,
much less a realistic one, of those alternatives in an effort to determine
if the employee's organizational rights were, for all practical purposes,
totally abrogated by a waiver. On the other hand, Mid-States recognizes
that without the ability to solicit and distribute on the premises very
18. Judge Castle speaking for the majority stated:
The contract provisions here assailed did not strip the employees of fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Act. The provisionspreclude only a convenient - albeit
a most effective - way of their exercise. Employees are free to forego their
qualified rights to on the premises organizational activity in favor of the available
alternatives thereto.
Id. at 392.
19. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). But see pp.
558-59 infra.
20. 337 F.2d at 392.
21. Id. In support of this policy consideration the court quoted with approval
dicta in May Dep't Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976, 981 n.17 (1944), modified, 154 F.2d
533 (8th Cir. 1946), a decision which, to the extent that it has been considered to
uphold these solicitation provisions, has been expressly overruled by the Board in
Gale Prods., 142 N.L.R.B. 1246 (1963).
22. The court in effect refused to sacrifice the individual's organizational rights
for the sake of stable industrial relations. This position finds support in the purpose
and policy of the Act
to eliminate the . . . substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce .. .
by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing ....
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
23. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Court
recognized that self-organization and selection of a bargaining agent are "fundamental
rights." The Court said: "Employees have as clear a right to organize and select
their representatives for lawful purposes as the respondent has to organize its business and select its own officers and agents." Id. at 33.
It is also recognized that the employer should remain strictly impartial when
the employee is exercising those organizational rights. E.g., International Ass'n of
Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1940) ; NLRB v. Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc.,
323 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1963) ; NLRB v. Gluek Brewing Co., 144 F.2d 847 (8th Cir.
1944); NLRB v. John Engelhorn & Sons, 134 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1943).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/8
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little remains of the employee's fundamental right to organize. Once the
dissident employees are denied use of the employer's premises for their
organizational activity, in most instances their chances of ousting the
union are negligible. Moreover, the Supreme Court has specifically recognized the importance of maintaining the employee's right to freely select
his bargaining representative. In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,2 4
Mr. Justice Burton stated:
[C]ollective-bargaining contracts frequently have included certain waivers of the employees' right to strike and of the employers'
right to lockout to enforce their respective economic demands during
the term of those contracts. Provided the selection of the bargaining
representative remains free, such waivers contribute to the normal
flow of commerce
and to the maintenance of regular production
25
schedules.

It is submitted that if the employee does not have the right to effectively
solicit, i.e., solicit on the premises, then the requisite precondition to
waiver of employee rights by the union - the free selection of the bargaining representative - does not exist. Unlike the Gale conclusion,
the Mid-States' position best effectuates the employee's organizational
rights under the Act. It is posited that the waiver of this right violates
the very essence of section 7 rights to organize "since solicitation and
distribution of literature on plant premises are important elements in
giving full play to the right of employees to seek displacement of an
26
incumbent union."
Criticism may be directed at the Mid-States rationale since it may
be read to reject, without consideration, the possibility of a truly effective alternative means of solicitation and distribution. If Mid-States
stands for such a blanket rejection, it would appear to be unwarranted.
Where there is a limited membership in the bargaining unit or a company town exists, it is quite possible that the membership could be solicited
off the premises with effectiveness closely approximating on-the-premises
activity. In such a case the employee maintains a meaningful and effective
right to organize. However, the Mid-States court limited its decision to
a finding that the right to solicit could not be waived "in this case."'27
Therefore Mid-States could be read, and it is suggested should be read,
not to invalidate a similar waiver when a truly effective alternative means
of soliciting is available, rather than an "alternative" that is illusory in
comparison to on-the-premises activity.
As noted above, the decision in Mid-States is supportive of the policy
underlying the National Labor Relations Act, which was designed primarily to benefit employees, not labor unions. 28 Unquestionably the most
24. 350 U.S. 270 (1955).
25. Id. at 280.
26. NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Prods., Inc., 403 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1968).
27. Id. at 706.
28. E.g., NLRB v. Federal Eng'r Co., 155 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1946); NLRB v.
Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1945) ; NLRB v. American Potash & Chem. Corp.,
113 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1940).
Published
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effective means of securing benefits for the employee is through a union
and the drafters of the Act recognized this when they provided for exclusive bargaining representation. 29 In keeping with this recognition, it
is well established that the union, while acting in this capacity, must
be afforded a wide range of authority. This authority includes the power
to waive certain employee rights in exchange for employer concessions.3"
The rationale for allowing the union to waive employee rights is that, in
the usual situation, the union and the employee are seeking mutually
desired goals - they have a common interest. However, where the issue
is the effective means of changing a bargaining agent there would appear
to be an inherent conflict between the employee's interests and the interest of the union which is presently serving as the bargaining representative. Therefore the rationale which supports the union's power
to bargain away certain employee's rights in the usual instance, does not
support this same power in the instant case. Thus, since the Act was
designed to promote the employee's interest, it would appear that MidStates, while recognizing the need for stable labor-management relations,
correctly protects the individual employee from a union waiver of an
effective means of exercising the essential right to self-organization. 31
It should be noted that the Mid-States court asserted that it would not
"presume ' 3 2 that the union's desire to entrench itself was not its primary
interest in securing the collective bargaining provisions. Thus it would
appear that if the union waiver of the employee's right to solicit on the
employer's premises was given as a quid pro quo for a truly significant
concession - such as management's consent to allow the union, and
thereby its members, a voice in management control it would be upheld.
It is submitted that this approach is correct in that it guarantees to individual employees economic concessions commensurate with the organizational rights waived. This assures that the strength of the union in its
negotiations is not unduly diluted and guarantees that the union is
working in the best interests of the employee.
The conclusion reached by the Mid-States court is further supported
by the fact that it is consistent with the Supreme Court's prior decisions 33
29. For a general discussion of benefits and rights derived from a collective bargaining agreement, see Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. R.v. 601
(1956) ;Hanslowe, Individual Rights In Collective Labor Relations, 45 CORNELL L.Q.
25 (1959); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration,
37 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 362 (1962) ; Note, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under
Labor Contracts, 73 YALE L.J. 1215 (1964).
30. See cases collected in note 14 supra.
31. In NLRB v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 1945), the Court said:
[T]he National Labor Relations Act was passed for the primary benefit of the
employees as distinguished from the primary benefit to labor unions, and the
prohibition of unfair labor practices designed by an employer to prevent the free
exercise by employees of their wishes in reference to becoming members of a
union was intended by Congress as a grant of rights to the employees rather
than as a grant of power to the union.
32. 403 F.2d at 705.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/8
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in the broad no-solicitation and no-distribution area.3 4 In Republic Aviation the Supreme Court prohibited the employer from unilaterally imposing a no-solicitation and no-distribution rule. It may be argued that
in the instant case the same prohibitions were again unilaterally imposed
on the employee through the joint agreement of the employer and the
union. It is clear that the union and the employer receive the primary
benefits from such an agreement; the union's ability to perpetuate itself
as the bargaining unit is greatly enhanced while the employer is assured
that his plant operations will not be interrupted through rival union
agitation. Therefore, it would appear that the imposition of the contract
proviso in this situation is just as one-sided - the union and the employer
versus the employee - as was the case in Republic Aviation. It should
be noted that Republic Aviation could be distinguished on the ground that
there the employee's initial organizational activity was frustrated rather
than the attempt to change bargaining representatives, and that the right
to have a bargaining representative is far more basic than the right to have
any particular representative. However, the rationale supporting Republic
Aviation, that the restriction on union solicitation was an unreasonable impediment to self-organization, would appear to be just as compelling in the
instant case as it was in Republic Aviation35 since both means of self-organi-

zation are necessary if the purposes behind this right are to be realized.
In conclusion, an examination of the conflicting positions adopted
by the courts of appeals suggest that in Mid-States the Fifth Circuit has
adopted the proper approach. While the courts should avoid unnecessarily
disrupting bargained-for concessions, they must be an active guardian
when the contract provisions infringe upon essential organizational rights
of the employee. As pointed out above, if the employee is prevented from
soliciting for a rival union on the company premises he has lost what,
in most instances, is the only effective means of changing his bargaining
representative. If the courts provide no relief from such contract prohibitions then the employee has been given a right without a means of
effectuating it.
Ward Williams
34. It has been suggested by one commentator that the Supreme Court's decisions

on free speech in the labor field provide firm footing to prohibit contract limitations
on the employees' right to solicit and distribute. 44 Ni. L. Rv. 645, 647-48 (1965).
See Affeldt, The Right of Association and Labor Law, 7 VILL. L. Rzv. 27 (1961);
Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. Riv. 151 (1957); Friedmann,
Corporate Power, Government By Private Groups, and The Law, 57 COLUm. L. Rvv.
155 (1957) ; Note, Duty of Union To Minority Groups In The Bargaining Unit, 65
HARV. L. Rzv. 490 (1952) ; Note, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under
Labor Contracts, 73 YALU L.J. 1215, 1232-38 (1964). But see Wellington, Union
Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System,
67 YALn L.J. 1327, 1340 (1958). See also Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor
Union, and "Governmental Action," 70 YALP L.J. 345, 366-74 (1961).
35. This same position was adopted by Judge Kiley, who dissented in Gale,
when he concluded that the rationale of Republic Aviation was pertinent to the contract prohibitions in Gale and that the contractual waivers were inclined to "smother
competitive union organizational activity .
NLRB v. Gale Prods., 337 F.2d 390,
392 (7th Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion).
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MAINTAIN BRAKES UNDER CALIFORNIA VEHICLE CODE.

Maloney v. Rath (Cal. 1968)
Plaintiff was injured when her vehicle, which was stopped at a traffic
light, was struck from behind by the defendant's automobile. Plaintiff
brought a negligence action and on appeal from a verdict for the defendant
at trial claimed that her injuries were proximately caused by the defendant's violation of California statutory provisions requiring every motor
vehicle to be equipped with adequate brakes.' Plaintiff argued that the
statute created absolute liability or, in the alternative, a nondelegable duty
to maintain adequate brakes. At trial the defendant established that the
accident was caused by the improper installation of a hydraulic brake
hose by her garageman 3 months prior to the accident, and offered evidence which proved that she did not know or have reason to know of
the latent defect until moments before impact. The jury found for the
defendant and the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Court of Appeal for the First District affirmed. 2 On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed, holding
that the motorist's duty to maintain adequate brakes in compliance with
the California Vehicle Code was nondelegable and therefore evidence of
freedom from personal fault on the part of the defendant will not be
a valid defense to a negligence action. Maloney v. Rath, .. Cal.2d
445 P.2d 513, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1968).
The advent of the automobile as a means of mass transportation has
posed the enormous social and legal problem of providing compensation
to thousands of highway accident victims. The concept of personal fault
has served as the traditional common law basis for allocating compensation in negligence cases.8 While this basis has proved serviceable as a
rule of general application in the law of negligence, its operation in the
area of automobile accident litigation presents serious difficulties. Due
to both the overwhelming number of such cases and the fact that the
adjudication of the issue of fault sometimes requires a jury trial, the
1. CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 26300, 26453, 26454 (West 1960). Section 26300
provides: "Every motor vehicle .. . shall be equipped with brakes adequate to control
the movement of the vehicle and to stop and hold the vehicle." Nearly all jurisdictions
have such statutes. 3 PROOF or FAcTs 4 (1961).
2. Maloney v. Rath, 65 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1968).
3.

1 T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIA3ILITY ch. 6 (1906); Ames, Law

and Morals, 22 HARV. L. RRv. 97 (1908) ; Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Strict
Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359 (1951) ; Issacs, Fault and Liability, 31 HARV. L. Rev.
954 (1918) ; James, Jr., An Evaluation of the Fault Concept, 32 TENN. L. Rev. 394
(1965) ; Sinha, The Problem of Application of the Fault Principle To Automobile
Accidents, 14 VILL. L. REv. 386 (1969). The American Bar Association House of
Delegates recently approved a committee report which proposed the retention of the
fault system as the basic legal structure for dealing with automobile accident cases.
37 U.S.L.W. 2441 (Feb. 4, 1969).
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accident victim often must endure the lengthy delays of litigation.4 Moreover, since recovery depends on the plaintiff's ability to establish the
defendant's negligence, the fault system may preclude compensation entirely. Even if the plaintiff can establish defendant's fault, recovery may
be denied because of his own contributory negligence 5 or the fact that
the financial status of the tortfeasor makes him judgment-proof. Although
it is beyond the judicial prerogative to abolish the fault system in the
interest of providing the proper allocation of compensation, 6 the courts
have sought to aid the accident victim by making it less difficult for a
plaintiff to establish the requisite fault. The judicial interpretation that
violation of a vehicle code may give rise to civil as well as criminal liability exemplifies this attitude7 because, while the defendant's liability remains based upon personal fault, his violation of the vehicle code affords
the plaintiff proof of that fault.8 The Maloney court seeks to further the
same objective - increasing the plaintiff's opportunities for recovery by imputing fault to the defendant on the theory of nondelegable duty.9
The concept of nondelegable duty has its roots in the principle of respondeat superior, which imposes liability on the master for the tortious
acts of his servants committed within the scope of their employment. 10
4. For somewhat dated but complete statistical analyses of how efficiently the fault
system operates, see Franklin, Shanin & Mark, Accidents, Money and the Law: A
Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1 (1961) ;
Morris & Paul, The FinancialImpact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. Rgv. 913
(1962) ; Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of PersonalInjury Litigation,
59 COLUM. L. REv. 1115 (1959). These articles are collected in WALTER E. MEYER
RESEARCH INSTITUTE oF LAW, DOLLARS, DELAY AND THE AuToMoBILE VICTIM
(1968).
5. The majority of American courts require that a plaintiff's contributory negligence be a substantial factor in causing his injury before compensation will be denied,
but a minority have held that any contributory negligence, however slight, defeats
recovery. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 431 (3d ed. 1964) ; Green, The Individual's
Protection Under Negligence Law: Risk Sharing, 47 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 751 (1953);
James, Jr., Imputed Contributory Negligence, 14 LA. L. REv. 340 (1954) ; James, Jr.,

Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953); Philbrick, Loss Apportionment
in Negligence Cases (pts. 1-2), 99 U. PA. L. Riv. 572, 766 (1951).
6. In Maki v. Frelk, 85 I1. App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (1967), the court
rejected the long-standing Illinois rule of contributory negligence and adopted a coinparative negligence rule. On appeal, the Illinois supreme court reversed, stating:
"After full consideration we think, however, that such a far-reaching change, if
desirable, should be made by the legislature rather than by the court." 40 Ill. 2d 193,
239 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1968).
7. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 191-205.
8. Various jurisdictions have found that failure to comply with a motor vehicle
code constitutes either: (1) some evidence of negligence; (2) prima facie evidence
of negligence; or (3) negligence per se. The majority of American jurisdictions,
including California, treat an unexcused violation as negligence per se. Id. at 202;
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.5 (1956) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 288B (1965).
9. The use of imputed fault to provide an accident victim with a financially

responsible defendant is not a device unfamiliar to the courts. Courts have theorized
that the owner of a vehicle is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the driver:
(1) if the owner is present in the vehicle (right-of-control doctrine), e.g., Ross v.

Burgan, 163 Ohio St. 211, 126 N.E.2d 592 (1955); for additional cases, see Annot.,
50 A.L.R.2d 1281 (1955) ; or (2) even if the owner is not present, if the negligent
driver is a member of the owner's family, e.g., Vaughn v. Booker, 217 N.C. 479, 8
S.E.2d 603 (1940) ; for additional cases, see Annot., 133 A.L.R. 981 (1940).
10. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History (pts. 1-3), 7 HARV.
L. REv. 315, 383, 441 (1894).
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Rather than deny compensation to an injured plaintiff, the courts deemed
it preferable to impute negligence to the master, who can effectively underwrite the costs involved as well as discipline his servants." As a general
rule, however, the doctrine of respondeat superior has not been applied
where an individual employs an independent contractor on the theory
that an individual has no legal or practical control over such an agent and
that he is not necessarily more financially responsible.' 2 However, innumerable exceptions have been carved out of this general rule,'1 3 which
the courts have designated as situations which give rise to nondelegable
duties. The judicial policy underlying these exceptions is the same as
that underlying the doctrine of respondeat superior. Both concepts are
shorthand methods of stating a judicial conclusion - that providing
compensation is of such social importance under certain circumstances
as to justify allocation of that compensation upon a basis of imputed,
rather than personal fault.' 4 The Maloney court, having reached such
a conclusion as to the importance of providing compensation to motor
vehicle accident victims, invoked sections 423 and 424 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, and expressed this conclusion by declaring the defendant's statutory duty to maintain her brakes in good working order to
be nondelegable.
Since the concept of nondelegable duty represents a policy-oriented
judicial conclusion, courts are relatively free to impute nondelegable duties
where none previously existed and, theoretically, a novel application of
the doctrine of nondelegable duty need not be rationalized by reference to
case law. However, when courts make a new application of the doctrine,
they invariably seek support from precedent to justify their participation
in this type of judicial legislation. The Maloney court focused on the
flexibility which the courts have enjoyed in this area by noting that in
previous cases it had found nondelegable duties in a wide variety of unrelated circumstances.' 5 Although this judicial flexibility facilitates a
broader use of the concept of nondelegable duty, it also creates uncertainty in the case law in this area. In order to obviate this uncertainty,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts organizes the case law into types of
fact patterns and relationships which have previously been held to give
rise to nondelegable duties.' 6
Since there appears to be no case law which even indirectly supports
the imposition of a nondelegable duty on the operator of a privately-owned
11. Morris, The Torts of Independent Contractors, 29 ILL. L. REv. 339, 340-41

(1934).
12. 2 F.

HARPER

& F.

JAMES,

supra note 8, at § 26.11; W.

PROSSER,

supra note 5,

at § 70; Morris, supra note 11.
13. F. MEcHEm, THE LAW op AGENCY §§ 480-90 (4th ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) ov TORTS § 409-29 (1965).
14. Williams, Liability for Independent Contractors, 1956 CAMB. L.J. 180, 190-98.
15.
Cal. 2d at ----445 P.2d at 516, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 900. For an informative
work on the kinds of duties that are delegable and the reasons therefor, see Comment,
Responsibility for the Torts of an Independent Contractor, 39 YALE L.J. 861 (1930).
16. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 409-29 (1965).
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automobile to maintain his brakes in a safe condition, 17 the Maloney court
focused upon the language of sections 423 and 424 and concluded that
these sections "point to a nondelegable duty in this case."' 8 These sections of the Restatement serve as persuasive support for the court's position only if the activity of driving an automobile is reasonably analogous
to the activities to which sections 423 and 424 appear to apply. Section
423 provides in part as follows:
One who carries on an activity which threatens a grave risk of serious
bodily harm or death unless the instrumentalities used are carefully
.. . maintained, and who employs an independent contractor to . . .

maintain such instrumentalities, is subject to the same liability for
physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in . . .
maintaining such instrumentalities as though the employer had himself done the work of .

.

. maintenance. 19

The commentary to this section indicates that it is directed at the construction and maintenance of instrumentalities used in activities which
stand "midway between those [activities] which are so little dangerous
and of such universal utility that personal fault is necessary to liability
and those abnormal activities which are so dangerous even if carefully
carried on as to require the imposition of liability irrespective of negligence." '20 Section 423 is a compromise between these competing social
policies: it applies when the activity in question is dangerous and hence
employers should be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of their
independent contractors, yet because of its general utility, the activity
should not be discouraged by the imposition of strict liability. The interplay of these competing policy considerations can be clearly discerned
in those cases which have utilized this section as a basis for their holding:
e.g., cases concerning the construction of high voltage transmission lines,21
the installation of natural gas mains,2 2 and the transportation of propane
gas.23 These same competing interests are present in the case of the

operation
mentality
firmed by
conferred
comments

of an automobile. That the automobile is a dangerous instruand that the activity of driving is hazardous is annually cona host of unfortunate statistics ;24 yet the innumerable benefits
on society by the automobile are also obvious. However, the
to section 423 and the cases decided under it have qualified the

17. The plaintiff in the instant case did not raise the issue whether California's
"adequate-brake" statute imposed a nondelegable duty either before the trial court or
the court of appeals.
18 -...... Cal. 2d at ...... 445 P.2d at 516, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) o
TORTS § 423 (1965).
20. Id., Explanatory Notes § 423, comment a at 410-11.
21. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc. v. Byrd, 264 F.2d 689, 693 (4th
Cir. 1958).
22. Araujo v. New Jersey Natural Gas Co., 62 N.J. Super. 88, 102, 162 A.2d 299,
306 (1960).
23. Community Gas Co. v. Williams, 87 Ga. App. 68, 78, 73 S.E.2d 119, 127 (1952).
24. ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA, ANNUAL 22 (1968), quotes the following statistics
for automobile accident fatalities: 1962 - 40,804; 1963 - 43,564; 1964 - 47,700;
- 49,163;
1966 -Charles
53,000;
1967School
(Jan.-Nov.)
- 47,960.
Published 1965
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of Law Digital
Repository, 1969

47

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1969], Art. 8
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14

above considerations by holding that the section applies only to "exceptional activities. '25 While the activity of driving an automobile may well
be characterized as both dangerous and socially beneficial, it clearly cannot be depicted as an exceptional activity. Therefore, while the competing
interests are the same, there would appear to be a significant dissimilarity
between the activities involved. Moreover, in order for the application
to be convincing, the activity of driving an automobile should be considered
highly dangerous for the same reason as those activities which fall under
section 423. Activities such as the installation of natural gas mains are
considered highly dangerous because of their capacity to cause grave
harm notwithstanding the infrequency of misadventure. On the other
hand, the activity of driving an automobile is made dangerous primarily
because it is a very common activity. For these reasons it is suggested
that section 423, when read in the context of the explanatory comments,
cannot be persuasively analogized to include the activity of driving an
automobile.
The Maloney court also relied on section 424 which provides:
One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty
to provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety of others
is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is
imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor
employed
26
by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.
While the language of this section is broad enough to encompass virtually
every safety statute or regulation, the explanatory comments limit its
application to only those instances where a statute or an administrative
regulation imposes a duty upon one doing "particular work" to provide
safeguards or precautions for the safety of others. 27 When this language
is considered in conjunction with the cases cited by the reporter of the
Restatement as supporting the rule2s which the section espouses, it appears that the section comprehends safety statutes concerned with certain
types of enterprises, often quasi-public in nature, which pose some special
danger to the community. Thus, railroads are not permitted to delegate
statutory duties imposed upon them in the interest of public safety ;29 those
who maintain the public highway may not delegate their duty to provide
25.

RESTATEMENT

(SEcOND)

op TORTs, Explanatory Notes § 423, comment a at

410 (1965).
26. RtSTATEWMNT (SECOND) or TORTS § 424 (1965).

27. Id., Explanatory Notes § 424, comment a at 411.
28. RESTATSMENT (SECOND) op TORTS, Appendix at 69-70 (1965). Generally
speaking, the cases cited by the reporter in support of the rule involve the use of land
or buildings in some manner which demands that special precautions (for example,
those embodied in building codes) be taken in order to insure public safety. Thus
the use of the words "particular work" would seem to indicate that the safety statutes
which section 424 encompasses are those which are directed at dangers which flow
from the use of land, especially from some form of construction or maintenance thereon.
29. Boucher v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 196 Mass. 355, 82 N.E. 15 (1907);
Choctaw, 0. & W.R. v. Wilkes, 16 Okla. 384, 84 P. 1086 (1906) ; Annot., 23 A.L.R.
984 (1923).
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adequate warning of obstructions ;30 and those engaged in urban building
may not delegate codified duties with respect to lateral support.8 1 Therefore it would seem that, except by virtue of the breadth of its language,
section 424 cannot be applied to the activity of driving a privately-owned
automobile without overextending the purpose of the section. The Maloney
court seems to have employed the broad language of section 424 as a
makeweight to support the novel position which it asserted under section
423.
The foregoing analysis suggests that when sections 423 and 424 are
read in the context of the comments to those sections and the cases applying them, neither section was drafted with the automobile in mind. However, it does not necessarily follow that these sections lend no support
to the position taken by the Maloney court. First, it appears clear that
the language of both sections, if divorced from the comments, might be
applied to the activity of driving an automobile. Second, although it is
the function of the explanatory comments to give some definition to the
broad formulations expressed in the sections, it is not their purpose to
establish inflexible boundaries in which the sections must operate. Moreover, one of the purposes of the Restatement is to reflect current trends
in the law. There can be little doubt that the movement in tort law
today is toward the socialization of risks through insurance or some other
mechanism which distributes the costs of compensation to the general
public. To the extent that sections 423 and 424 participate in this general
trend, the broad language of those sections does "point to a nondelegable
82
duty in this case."
Despite the fact that vehicle codes have long contained maintenance
provisions, the question whether they impose nondelegable duties has only
been infrequently considered by Anglo-American courts.3 At least two
British courts have considered the issue raised in the instant case and,
contrary to the California court, have held that the duty of maintenance
was delegable.8 4 In Phillips v. Britannia Hygienic Laundry,35 the court
30. Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, __ Cal. 2d _, 437 P.2d 508, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20
(1968) ; Miller v. State, 137 Misc. 768, 244 N.Y.S. 547 (Ct. Cl.), aft'd on other
grounds, 231 App. Div. 363, 247 N.Y.S. 399 (1931).
31. Wharman v. Investment Underwriters, Inc., 58 Cal. App. 2d 346, 136 P.2d
363 (1943); Union Course Holding Corp. v. Tomasetti Const. Co., 184 Misc. 382,
52 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ; Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 95 (1952).
32.
Cal. 2d at _, 445 P.2d at 516, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
33. A clearly distinguishable American case is Beauchamp v. B & L Motor
Freight, 106 Ohio App. 530, 152 N.E.2d 334, 6 Ohio Op. 2d 237 (1958), noted in, 29
U. Cix. L. Rgv. 138 (1960), where the Ohio Supreme Court held that the lessor of
a tractor-trailer had a nondelegable duty to maintain the vehicle's brakes. However,
the court seems to have done so without reference to the provisions of the Ohio

Vehicle Code. Although the court characterized the vehicle as an inherently dangerous
instrumentality employed in a common calling, no reference was made to section 423
of the Restatement. Since the court relied on section 425, which can have no application to the private owner, Beauchamp lends little support to the position taken b
the Maloney court. But cf. Fuller v. Palazzolo, 329 Pa. 93, 110, 197 A.2d 22,

233 (1938).

34. Stennett v. Hancock, [1939] 2 All E.R. 578 (K.B.); Phillips v. Britannia
Hygienic Laundry, 1 K.B. 539, aff'd, [1923] 2 K.B. 832.
35, [1923]
1 K.B.Charles
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reasoned that a defendant who has no personal expertise in the maintenance of motor vehicles can comply with the vehicle code only by employing an expert to inspect and maintain the vehicle in a roadworthy
condition. Only if he should attempt the maintenance himself or completely refrain from taking preventative measures may he be negligent
in the first instance. That court further reasoned that since the defendant
had no personal expertise and since he had properly selected and paid a
competent expert to maintain the vehicle, he should be entitled to rely
on the quality of the work. Therefore, the Phillips court held that the
defendant can discharge his statutory duty by properly selecting an independent contractor.8 6
By its rejection, without discussion, of the British court's theory,
the Maloney court encumbers the defendant with a two-step burden of
proof. If the defendant is to avoid the consequences of his violation of
the statute - negligence per se _3 he must initially show that "he did
what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence,
s88
acting under similar circumstances who desired to comply with the law."
If it is assumed that the defendant is not a competent mechanic himself,
he must introduce evidence that the vehicle has been inspected or otherwise maintained by a properly selected garageman.89 The defendant must
then establish "that the failure was not owing to the negligence of any
agent, whether employee or independent contractor, employed by him to
inspect or repair the brakes." ' 40 Under California law the defendant's
inability to excuse his violation of an auto-safety statute may justify a
directed verdict against him. 4 1

Since the Maloney decision apparently

makes the second step of the defendant's burden an integral part of a
successful defense, the defendant may presumably suffer a directed verdict
notwithstanding his proof of personal innocence. Furthermore, even if
the defendant can introduce evidence tending to prove that his agents
were not negligent, the effect of the present decision is to increase the
plaintiff's chances of getting his cause before the jury, as such, thereby
increasing his chances for compensation.
Although the imposition of this nondelegable duty on the motorist
by the Maloney court might seem harsh and unfair to some, the decision
can be rationalized if one assumes, as the court tacitly did, that the defendant is adequately insured. If that assumption is true, the judicial
objective of providing the plaintiff with an available as well as a financially responsible defendant is achieved with relatively little personal cost
to the defendant. The cost of compensation is underwritten by an agency
36. Id. at 556.
37. See note 7 supra.
38. Alarid v. Vanier, 50 Cal. 2d 617, 624, 327 P.2d 897, 900 (1958), later incorporated in CAL. EvID. COD4 § 669 (West Supp. 1968).
39. Ponce v. Black, 224 Cal. App. 2d 159, 163, 36 Cal. Rptr. 419, 421 (1964).
40. Clark v. Dziadas, __ Cal. 2d __, 445 P.2d 517, 518, 71 Cal. Rptr. 901, 902
(1968). This case, decided on the same day as Maloney, clearly sets forth the
defendant's two-step burden of proof in excusing his violation of the statute.
41. CAL. EvID. CoDE § 669, comments at 24 (West Supp. 1968).
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which can best socialize the immense costs of a problem of enormous
proportions. If the defendant can afford insurance and has none, he
can hardly merit sympathy. If he has inadequate insurance, he has recourse by way of indemnity against his negligent agent and, since the
defendant is only vicariously liable, his insurance company will be subrogated to his rights of indemnity.4 2 Because the garageman must now
defend against the insurance company rather than the injured party, the
probability of his completely escaping or greatly reducing his liability is
materially lessened. This may serve to encourage mechanics to be more
diligent in their work and to effectively insure themselves against liability.
The instant decision may be further rationalized if it is placed in
its proper perspective. The problem to which the court addressed itself
- providing adequate compensation to automobile accident victims - is
of grave national concern. The flood of literature presently issuing from
commentators only serves to emphasize the urgency of the problem.4 3 The
solutions proposed by some seem extreme, as they would dispense with
the concept of fault in order to allocate some compensation.4 4 Thus, in
relation to the dimensions of the problem and some of the proposed solutions to it, the instant decision may be less of an innovation than would
first appear. Moreover, since the problem is bound to intensify in the
absence of corrective action, the enactment of remedial legislation becomes
increasingly probable.4 5 Although the present decision is conceptually
grounded upon a strained utilization of the Restatement, its underlying
rationale is clearly the socialization of automobile accident risks through
insurance. By its decision in Maloney, the Supreme Court of California
seems to be underscoring the necessity for the enactment of comprehensive
legislation which would realize that socialization.
John A. Roney
42. Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 381, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301,
309 (1962) ; Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy, 180 Cal. App. 2d 69, 79, 4 Cal. Rptr.
379, 385-86 (1960) ; San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Maintenance Co., 162 Cal. App. 2d 434, 445, 328 P.2d 785, 792 (1958). See generally
RESTATEMENT OF RtSTITUTION §§ 93(2), 96 (1936); Molinari, Tort Indemnity in
California, 8 SANTA CLARA LAW. 159 (1968).
43. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA STATE BAR, REPORT OF THIE COMMITTEE ON PERSONAL

INJURY CLAIMS

VERSITY

(1965), reprinted in, 40 J.S.B.

COUNCIL FOR

RESEARCH

IN

CAL.

THE SOCIAL

148 (1965);

SCIENCES,

COLUMBIA UNI-

REPORT

BY THE

COM-

MITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (1932) ; A. Ehrenweig,
"FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1954) ; L. Green, TRAFFIC
VICTIMS TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958) ; R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, BASIC
PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965); Franklin, Replacing the Negligence
Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. Rgv. 774 (1967).

44. See note 43 supra.

45. Puerto Rico has already adopted a "no-fault" plan and the legislatures of at
least twenty-seven other jurisdictions are presently considering such legislation. 37
U.S.L.W. 2442 (Feb. 4, 1969).
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